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ExEcutivE Summary
The current situation, challenges and opportunities
The natural gas markets of the Visegrad Four countries (V4) are characterised 
by very similar problems:
•	 dominance of Russian supplies under long term, oil linked contracts;
•	 limited interconnection (except between Czech Republic and Slovakia);
•	 overwhelming East-West flows;
•	 limited, though growing, internal competition and, as a consequence, poor 
market liquidity;
•	 expected increasing demand due to the gradual loss of competitiveness of more 
polluting fuels, as well as of more gas penetration in the residential market;
•	 low security of supply standards.
The similarity of issues and geographical proximity have led the V4 countries 
to undertake closer collaboration, notably by agreeing on a common security 
of supply strategy, including regional emergency planning, and a common im-
plementation of the Gas Target Model that European regulators have proposed 
for the medium-long term design of the EU gas market, and which has been 
endorsed by the Madrid Regulatory Forum. Yet it is clear that Slovakia and 
even more the Czech Republic are more integrated into the Western European 
market thanks to larger interconnection endowed with firm reverse flow ca-
pacity; whereas Hungary has several interconnections that require improve-
ment, and the interconnection of Poland with Western Europe and the other 
V4 countries is very limited. Market competition has been affected by these 
infrastructural characteristics. Effective interconnection of all V4 countries 
as part of the North-South Corridor in Central Europe is expected by 2017-18.
V4 collaboration on the gas market starts at a time of important changes, which 
are sources of challenges as well as of opportunities. In particular:
•	 cheaper gas is available, mainly as LNG arrived in Western Europe, where 
gas demand is often declining or stagnating. The V4 countries may shortly 
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exploit this opportunity at a lower cost through the new LNG terminal in 
Świnoujście, Poland;
•	 the implementation of the European Network Codes and of the recently 
adopted EU Congestion Management rules may open up pipeline capacity 
with interconnected LNG terminals in Western Europe, Turkey and Greece 
in the same way as it has recently happened for interconnections between 
V4 countries and their Western neighbours, which have become partly 
available for (physical or virtual) reverse flow services. More generally, 
this  will require a major review of market regulation, which represents an 
opportunity to harmonize it within the V4 region, with a view to establish 
a common market;
•	 large pipeline projects from the East may bring into the region (notably in 
Hungary) new supplies through the Nabucco West , TAP or South Stream 
pipelines. 
Less certain but potentially even larger change potential could be obtained 
from other sources: 
•	 new production opportunities in the region and in the neighbouring coun-
tries, notably from unconventional gas;
•	 connection to the North Sea continental shelf through the Baltic;
•	 new LNG terminals in the Balkans (Croatia and others);
•	 a more aggressive competitive behaviour by companies that sell Russian gas.
The V4 decision to cooperate for the exploitation of these opportunities is clear-
ly justified. The GTM studies have noticed that investments aimed at a certain 
market areas are boosted by the availability of a liquid and reasonably com-
petitive market. In turn this requires a market size of tentatively 20 bcm/year 
and the availability of at least three different sources, with a reasonably low 
market concentration (with an HHI index around 2000)1*. None of the V4 coun-
tries can individually achieve any of these conditions at present: only Poland 
may have such capacity in coming years, although through LNG supplies that 
1 Michel Glachant, “A Vision for the EU Target Model: the MECO-S Model”, EUI Working Pa-
per RSCAS 2011/38. www.florence-school.eu
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may be rather costly in the short term and a very dramatic fall of the incum-
bent’s market share, which could probably be achieved only by an aggressive 
gas release programme. Otherwise, the availability of three different sources 
is currently possible only through “backhaul” supplies from the West, which 
is not direct, often interruptible and therefore less reliable. On the other hand 
a common V4 market would allow the achievement of at least two such condi-
tions (market size and concentration) and help achieve the third one by trig-
gering investment in new supplies and connections. 
In the framework of the institutional cooperation among the V4 countries, 
their National Regulatory Authorities have been asked to prepare a joint Re-
port, with detailed National Annexes, on the analysis of market liquidity in the 
V4 countries. This Report is extremely useful as it provided exhaustive infor-
mation on the state of infrastructure, market structure, regulation, competi-
tion, trading arrangements and tools, as well as the suggestion of measures to 
boost liquidity. On the other hand the Report mostly focuses on the description 
of the existing situation, underlining missing links; but it does not consider 
market opportunities nor does it propose even a high level market design. The 
present study aims to propose such a design and to list the main steps of a road-
map for its implementation.
Principles of an enhanced V4 collaboration
The political proposals for a joint V4 implementation of the GTM calls for the 
establishment of a virtual trading point in the region, supported by a single 
balancing zone, and with an energy exchange for gas trading. Harmonised 
transmission products would ensure gas flows throughout the region and 
across it.
It is suggested that the implementation of these cornerstones should be con-
sistent with three policy principles.
•	 Any market design should be implemented consistently with market op-
portunities, possibly by the consistent adoption of policy instruments (in-
cluding taxes, subsidies and action by government-owned companies) that 
are suitable to foster the smoothest convergence of business and political 
decisions. In other words, the objectives of V4 collaboration should be fully 
consistent with business interests and companies' strategies;
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•	 Existing cooperation projects extending beyond the V4 region should be 
encompassed in the region rather than substituted for, notably as these in-
volve integration with more advanced and competitive markets;
•	 A process should be designed rather than an abstract market design. Pri-
ority should be given to flexible solutions that may evolve into one of the 
available theoretical model, or a combination of them, without regrets for 
any investment that might have been taken towards inadequate solutions.
All V4 countries are Members of the South-South East European market re-
gion, one of three into which the Gas Regional Initiative is articulated (GRI SSE). 
It also comprises Italy, Slovenia, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus and 
Greece. The V4 countries have important interconnections with other SSE 
countries, in particular with Austria and Romania, as well as with other EU 
countries, particularly Germany. Within the GRI SSE, several pilot projects 
and studies involving V4 countries are currently in preparation. Almost all of 
them involve relationships on the East-West axis, like the GATRAC project be-
tween the Czech, the Slovak and a German TSO (Ontras), allowing for the pur-
chase and management of bundled capacity across the three borders, through 
the Lanzhot and Hora sv. Kateriny Interconnection Points; a bundled capac-
ity allocation project will soon be started on the Lasow IP between Poland's 
Gaz-System and Germany's Ontras. A similar one has recently been launched 
between Hungary and Romania. Further activities regarding implementation 
of EASEE-Gas Common Business Practices, a cross border balancing platform, 
and a model for future balancing and trading regions, are also reported but 
their advancement is not clear.
Applicable high level design models
There are several basic models that may be considered for the integration of 
V4 countries. Some of them can also be combined, or be modified so that they 
become different development stages rather than alternative solutions. Their 
feasibility is related to infrastructure development in various ways that are 
discussed in the Report. 
•	 Single cross border market zone. The establishment of a single entry-exit 
and balancing zone has the advantage of ensuring the achievement of the GTM 
objectives in terms of market size and concentration, and could bring the V4 
close to the GTM objective of having access to all least three different signifi-
cant sources once a suitable interconectors are developed for interconnection. 
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The objective would be fully met if connections to new sources like Caspian 
gas or Mediterranean LNG are built; if they are reached by long distance pipe-
lines bringing gas form the Caspian region; or if new unconventional resourc-
es are developed inside the V4 countries. On the other hand this is a demand-
ing solution, as it requires a full harmonisation of market rules and practices, 
a lack of internal congestion and a single market operator. This solution does 
not necessarily require the full merger of TSOs, but at least a very close co-
operation and probably the establishment of a coordination body for revenue 
compensation, dispatching and balancing related activities. A single market 
operator is expected to emerge once the merger is complete.
•	 Trading region. This concept has been suggested as an option for the Eu-
ropean GTM. It envisages a single tariff and price zone (and hence a single 
market operator) but separate balancing areas, which may coincide with 
individual (National) TSOs, or parts thereof. Like the next one (market 
coupling), this model is unprecedented in gas, and needs to be clarified on 
several aspects. It would still require a remarkable coordination effort on 
tariff and dispatching issues, but less than with the single zone.
•	 Multiple coupled market zones. Several zones with formally working 
spot markets, though not very liquid, may be connected through market 
coupling once they are interconnected. The interconnection may be limited 
and some congestion may occur and it would be dealt with by an algorithm 
where different prices may emerge after joint bids are presented daily in 
the coupled zones. This solution requires less interconnection investment 
but some market rules harmonisation effort, as for the single price zone. 
Yet no single tariff or dispatching are necessary. There may be separate 
market operators but a common office for market coupling must be desig-
nated. The main difficulty is the very limited experience in adopting the 
market coupling concept in gas markets. Some experience and studies are 
being developed within the NNW Gas Regional Initiative and may provide 
advice about the feasibility and condition of market coupling.
•	 Independent connection to more liquid zones. This solution avoids any 
proposal of active market integration, with the exception of those necessary 
to ensure the security of supply standards required by Regulation 994/2010/
EC. This approach considers that markets can in fact be integrated, with sub-
stantial price alignment, by market forces that select one or more favourite 
trading spots, which act as benchmarks for other market zones. This hap-
pens if all connected zones can “shop” in that market, even with limited 
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direct interconnection between them. Likewise, V4 countries may limit their 
interconnection and harmonisation to what is justified by market decisions 
or physical security of supply requirements, but decide to elect (e.g.) a Ger-
man (or a future merged German-Dutch) hub as their natural marketplace. 
Under this solution, the regulatory strategy would be partly different and fo-
cus more on ensuring the viability of connections with the most liquid hubs 
and the availability of transmission products to move gas from/to it.
Proposals for joint GTM V4 implementation and related difficulties
Upon consideration of the possible models, the market situation and opportu-
nities and the available theoretical models for market integration, the follow-
ing strategy is tentatively proposed for discussion among V4 stakeholders. This 
proposal considers the most likely development of new infrastructure, notably 
interconnections between the V4 countries, and is tailored so that deeper inte-
gration follows the completion of the connecting pipelines.
1. Establishment of a working connection among the V4 and with neigh-
bouring countries. NRAs and TSOs should work to ensure that market 
rules and procedures ensure the smoothest connection for delivery of gas 
to and from hubs across the western V4 border. In particular, harmonised 
capacity products should be developed as part of the implementation of 
the European Capacity Allocation Network Code, including for delivery 
by backhaul (virtual reverse flow), between all interconnected V4 and if 
possible through intermediate countries. The products should also ensure 
deliveries to and from working Western European hubs. This activity can 
start immediately as it does nor require any new infrastructure.
2. Development of market zones. Existing entry-exit market zones should 
be consolidated and remaining wholesale price controls gradually phased 
out. The market zones may include the Austrian/Czech/Slovak trading re-
gion proposed within the GRI-SSE, using the large existing interconnec-
tion capacity of the three countries. However the adoption of this solution 
should be integrated by the connection of the Hungarian and Polish market 
zones, subject to market coupling due to the limited existing interconnec-
tion. It is however beyond the scope of this paper to take positions or pro-
vide suggestion about the inclusion of other countries into the V4 market.
3. Connection of the V4 countries. Physical interconnection between Hun-
gary, Slovakia and Poland as well as an enhancement of the link between 
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the Czech Republic and Poland should proceed rapidly for the sake of the 
credibility of any further V4 integration plans. Interconnections between 
the V4 countries and the absence of congestion within gas network is a pre-
requisite for further actions aimed at regional GTM implementation.
4. Joint implementation of the European Network Codes. This would pave 
the way for harmonised market rules that would be the basis of integration 
as a single market zones or as a trading region. Coordinated work by V4 
NRAs and TSOs would also facilitate their hard tasks in the implementa-
tion of ENCs, and improve regulatory quality and stability. 
5. In particular NRA and TSO cooperation would be targeted at:
a. the establishment of a single entry-exit tariff zone;
b. Coordinated implementation of the Capacity Allocation Mechanism 
(CAM);
c. A coordinated capacity development mechanism, based on integrated 
auctions or open seasons, with contributions from public institutions; 
d. Harmonised balancing rules would be useful, although this would not 
necessarily mean the merging of the balancing zones, which should be 
decided at a later stage;
e. Common congestion management criteria, in line with the new Annex 
I of Regulation 715/2009/EC.
6. V4 countries should also work towards the adoption of common criteria 
for customer protection, based on wholesale prices established in the 
V4 market(s). It is worth recalling that the kact that the (even perceived) 
imposition of price freezes that may not cover costs is a major obstacle of 
market liberalisation and integration and should be temporary and re-
lated to objective criteria.
7. Implementation of a single market zone in the V4 region Standardised ca-
pacity products linking the zones should be developed building on the exam-
ples that are being developed (GATRAC, PRISMA, Hungary-Romania etc.) and 
be subject to co-ordinated auctions. Other neighbouring countries (Austria, 
Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, and others) may be invited to join the process.
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8. Decision on final market design. The effort to carry out the previous 
steps will probably take about three years. Only at that point and in rela-
tion to the resulting outcome could a choice be made about the final market 
design, deciding on the maintenance of the starting mix, a trading region 
extended to all V4 (and possibly other) countries, or a large single market 
and balancing zone. The outcome should be decided by an operational study 
evaluating the possibility of dispatching and balancing in the whole zone in 
relation to actual flows and available infrastructure. 
Institutional issues
The pursuit of this plan would entail significant institutional developments. In 
order to enhance credibility and ensure a steady implementation of the plan, 
several entities in charge of their achievements must be identified or created. 
The establishment of joint bodies for an enhanced co-operation at the V4 level 
would stress the credibility of the market rules as internationally coordinated 
regulations are much more stable than national ones: 
However, the creation of new bodies should be minimised to avoid bureauc-
ratisation. The GRI SSE may offer a suitable institutional framework for the 
regulatory harmonisation, provided it becomes more operational (following 
the electricity RI example) and is practically articulated into smaller sub-
zones, among which one should be the V4. ENTSOG, ACER and other organisa-
tions also offer platforms for international co-ordination. On the other hand, it 
should be clear that V4 integration is expected to be a stronger and tighter link 
than the general EU integration process.
Within such framework, committees for the streamlining of market rules and 
the implementation of network codes could be set up, with leading roles di-
vided among the participating NRAs and TSOs, in charge of 
•	 capacity product organisation, allocation and congestion management;
•	 interoperability and business practices;
•	 tariffs;
•	 balancing.
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Such committees might be based on similar experiences within ENTSOG, 
ACER and GRIP experience.
A common gas exchange need not be established by international agreement 
but may emerge from market developments. A body in charge of infrastruc-
ture development procedure, which may be located at regulatory level, would 
probably be useful.
TSO coordination of transmission management activities, tariff revenue calcu-
lation and redistribution would be necessary and would represent a major devel-
opment, as it would probably need the competences of an Independent System 
Operator. This is however an open issue: some TSOs even in the region are trying 
to envisage cooperation in the establishment of common market zones without 
a formal coordination body. On the other hand, the evolution of the European gas 
transmission industry is probably towards broader collaboration and alliances, 
even though this does not necessarily require full mergers.
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I. INTRODuCTION
The similarity of issues and geographical proximity have led the Visegrad 
4 countries (V4) to undertake closer collaboration in natural gas policy, nota-
bly by agreeing on a common security of supply strategy, including regional 
emergency planning, and a common implementation of the Gas Target Model 
(GTM) that European regulators have proposed for the medium-long term de-
sign of the EU gas market, and which has been endorsed by the Madrid Regu-
latory Forum2.
As a contribution to this collaboration, the present paper will analyse how the 
GTM may be implemented in the V4 region, with a view to maximise the ben-
efits that arise from joint implementation. A most relevant conclusion of the 
GTM is that markets should be large enough to attract market players and in-
vestments, so that sufficient diversity of sources may be reached and market 
power indicators are kept below dangerous levels. In most cases, this requires 
physical and/or virtual interconnection of present markets, which is also use-
ful to achieve the required security of supply standards, as envisaged in the 
Regulation 994/2010/EC. 
The political proposals for a joint V4 implementation of the GTM call for the es-
tablishment of a virtual trading point in the region, supported by a single bal-
ancing zone, and with an energy exchange for gas trading. Harmonised trans-
mission products would ensure gas flows throughout the region and across it. 
In turn this requires:
•	 the elimination of regulatory and trade barriers between V4 countries; 
•	 the construction or reinforcement of infrastructure foreseen for the North-
South Corridor (NSC) in Central Europe as a key diversification project for 
the region;
•	 the definition and implementation of a roadmap leading to an integrated 
market.
This paper assumes that the implementation of these cornerstones should be 
consistent with two policy principles.
2 See the Conclusions of the XXI Madrid Gas Regulatory Forum, 22-23 March 2012, http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/gas/forum_gas_madrid_en.htm
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1. Any proposed design should be consistent with market opportunities, and 
be based on the consistent adoption of policy instruments (including taxes, 
subsidies regulations and action by government-owned companies) that 
are suitable to foster the smoothest convergence of business and political 
decisions. In other words, the objectives of V4 collaboration should be made 
consistent with business interests and companies' strategies;
2. Existing cooperation projects extending beyond the V4 region should be 
encompassed in the region rather than substituted for, notably as these in-
volve integration with more advanced and competitive markets.
The paper does not analyse in detail the costs and benefits of infrastructure 
development for interconnection of national V4 markets. This has been already 
analysed in several studies3. In general, Cost-Benefit Analysis of options should 
be performed. This is beyond the scope of the present Report.
The study starts from an analysis of the main difficulties and barriers faced by 
gas market development in each V4 country, and assesses how the GTM could 
be developed in them. This analysis has been based on interviews with stake-
holders in all V4 countries, which have also been used to obtain feedback about 
a possible joint GTM implementation. Stakeholders included Ministries, Na-
tional Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), Transmission System Operators (TSO), 
gas suppliers and traders, Distribution System Operators (DSOs), Market Op-
erators (MOs), independent think tanks and experts. A list is provided at the 
end of the report, however no opinions are directly reported and any responsi-
bility for judgements and proposals lies entirely with the author.
In the framework of the V4 cooperation, each NRA has drafted a detailed Report 
on Gas Market Liquidity, outlining the current conditions of gas markets, their 
regulatory regimes and the problems of further V4 integration. The reader is 
referred to such Reports for a more precise description. In section 2, starting 
from such Reports and the interviews, the situation of each country is assessed 
with a view to assess the benefits, difficulties and ways of further integration.
In section 3, the main opportunities facing V4 gas markets and justifying their 
integration are reviewed. 
3  Péter Kaderják, The Danube Region Gas Market Model and its application to identifying 
natural gas infrastructure priorities for the Danube Region, Conference on EU Strategy for 
the Danube Region, 20 June 2012, Brussels.
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In section 4, the main abstract models that are available for the implementa-
tion of the GTM are briefly illustrated and their feasibility is discussed with 
respect to the actual V4 situation. 
In section 5, a proposal for the implementation of the GTM in the V4 region is 
presented, outlining the main necessary steps. The proposal does not consist of 
a fully detailed and predetermined market design, but is a process where it is 
shown how the actual design could be decided by the relevant institutions on 
the basis of actual market and regulatory developments.
In section 6, the main institutional consequences and conditions for the devel-
opment of the GTM process are discussed. 
Author would like to thank to FSR Director Jean-Michel Glachant and OSW 
Director Olaf Osica for their continuous support, to Annika Zorn for her 
precious work in the Project administration, and to Tomasz Dąborowski for 
his great effort in the organisation of short notice meetings with the stake-
holders. Interviewees listed at the end of the report kindly provided their 
opinions and information on issues addressed by this Report, but these are 
reported – if any – only anonymously. Responsibility about the contents re-
mains only with the author.
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II. ThE CuRRENT SITuATION Of ThE VISEgRAD gAS 
MARkETS
1. Overview 
The natural gas markets of V4 countries have a very similar history, which 
still affects their current problems. They were developed when the V4 and 
other Central and Eastern European Republics were centrally planned econ-
omies tightly connected with the Soviet Union. Gas markets were devel-
oped by state bodies, originally exploiting domestic resources that existed 
but were limited in all current V4 countries. Consumption development was 
boosted from the 1970s, when the Soviet Union started to export natural gas 
towards Western Europe and built long distance pipelines that crossed the 
V4 countries leaving some gas on the way to integrate their limited domestic 
production. In particular, two major pipelines were developed: a Northern 
one, known as Yamal (largely parallel to the older Northern Lights system), 
crossing Belarus and Polish territory into Eastern Germany; and a larger 
Southern route (known as Brotherhood) through Ukraine and Czechoslova-
kia, which was split between a branch heading for Southern Germany and 
France and another reaching Austria, Italy, Slovenia and Croatia. Two large 
spurs sprang off this route in Western Ukraine and in Eastern Austria, feed-
ing Hungary and (through it) Serbia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. These pipe-
lines are mapped in Figure 1 below and stylised in Figure 2, where technical 
capacities are also shown.
The political situation and in particular the lack of open access to these pipe-
lines led to dominance of Russian supplies, which came under long term con-
tracts with prices linked to those of crude oil and derivatives. After markets 
started to open following the entry of V4 countries into the EU in 2004, at-
tempts were made to diversify supplies, with Norway as the main candidate. 
Later, as more liquid hubs started to develop beyond the V4's western borders, 
supplies could be activated from traders who were active on such hubs, out of 
their portfolios: in such a case the final origin of the gas can hardly be ascer-
tained. Yet, considering the physical flows, it is clear that all gas that is con-
sumed in V4 and is not locally produced comes from Russia, with very few ex-
ceptions. Western supplies are in fact obtained by swaps or through virtual 
reverse flow capacity.
In particular in the last few years, delayed implementation of the EU princi-
ples requiring Third Party Access, the advent of the Third Package and the 
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Security of Supply Regulation (No. 994/2010) have led to the opening of some 
virtual reserve flow (or back-haul) capacity on the large two interconnec-
tions of Poland and the Czech Republic with Germany. Although rather large, 
this capacity is mostly interruptible, and is therefore not regarded by most 
actual prospective suppliers as a suitable basis for a consistent competitive 
challenge of suppliers who can rely on firm capacity. Not surprisingly, the 
market shares of newcomers to these markets have not exceeded the shares 
of firm entry capacity connected to Western Europe (see Table 1). However, 
some firm reverse capacity has also been developed in a few Interconnection 
Points (see Figure 2).
Table 1. Supplies to Visegrad countries
(bcm, 2011) Czech Rep. hungary Poland Slovakia V4
Domestic 0.1 2.4 4.3 0.1 6.9
Russia 5.86 5.66 9.28 5.33 26.13
Norway 0.27 0.27
Other West 3.1 1.06 1.55 5.71
Total 9.33 9.12 15.13 5.43 39.01
NG share of primary 
energy, 2011 (%)
17.2 40.4 13.4 32.9 24.9
Per capita consumption 
(cubic meters/ year, 
2011)
914.7 912.0 394.0 987.3 608.6
Source: BP, Eurostat
Besides limited available capacity and supplies from sources other than Rus-
sia, a common and critical feature of the V4 is the very limited interconnection 
among them, with the exception of the Czech Republic – Slovakia link that is 
part of the Brotherhood system. In fact only a very small local interconnection 
is active between the Czech Republic and Poland. 
At present, only indirect interconnections are theoretically feasible through 
neighbouring countries. However, in practice connection opportunities 
though Ukrainian territory can hardly be used yet. Geographically, the inter-
connections of Ukraine with Poland at Drozdowicze, with Slovakia at Velké 
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Kapušany and with Hungary at Beregdaroc are relatively close to each other. 
However, being non-EU entry points, they are not subject to the same TPA 
obligation of intra EU IPs. Therefore, it is hard to establish any interruptible 
or firm, physical or virtual reverse capacity rights on such points, with the 
partial exception of Drozdowicze. Difficulties in flowing gas through this link 
into Ukraine have been reported and in fact it has only been used for small 
amounts; even though it is already on the ground, this link does not appear to 
be a reliable option for permanent interconnection between Poland, Slovakia 
and Hungary, although some stakeholders are more optimistic and occasional 
swaps cannot be ruled out. 
As for Western connections, the Austrian hub4 could be an option for the con-
nection of Slovakia (and indirectly the other V4 countries) with Hungary. This 
could be an available opportunity in the short term and using existing infra-
structure, however the small capacity and frequent congestion of the AT-HU 
interconnector (known as HAG) reduces the scope of this route. In turn, Poland 
has a limited firm connection capacity from Germany, which could be also used 
for connection with the Czech Republic. Some larger capacity is interruptible, 
as back-haul on the Yamal pipeline in Mallnow, which is expected to be turned 
into firm (physical reverse flow, see section 4 for more).
To sum up, V4 countries have seen overwhelming East-West flows, with lim-
ited quantities left in the region, and as a consequence poor liquidity. Very 
limited, though growing, internal competition from companies that have 
used the same infrastructure (or limited other infrastructure) to attain vir-
tual or physical reverse flows. This has happened particularly in the last 
2-3 years thanks to the growing availability of cheaper gas in Western Eu-
rope, priced with no or lower reference to oil derivatives and mostly coming 
from the North Sea or as LNG regasified in Western European terminals and 
as a consequence of poor liquidity. This development has not been the same 
in the individual V4 countries.
4 The Austrian hub used to be a physical one, based in the major pipeline node of Baumgar-
ten, near the Slovakian border. From 1 January 2013 this hub has been turned into a virtual 
one to bring it into line with the EU regulations and target model, encompassing the whole 
Eastern region of Austria, managed by the Austrian Gas Connect TSO and including over 
90% of the Austrian end user market.
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2. The Czech Republic
The Czech market is a mature one, in spite of the relatively small gas share of 
the country's primary energy. The Czech Republic has a remarkable nuclear 
industry and is one of the few European countries that are still investing in 
nuclear power; moreover it is home to substantial coal production. Yet its per 
capita gas consumption is still the highest among the V4, driven notably to its 
large industrial component, but total consumption has been declining since 
2001. However, the spreading of individual heating in the residential sector, 
and a possible replacement of coal in power and heat generation due to stricter 
environmental rules in the EU may entail a certain mid-term recovery. 
Among the V4, the Czech market is also the most open and advanced in terms 
of competitiveness and organisation. It is also the most advanced in terms of 
supply diversity. Its resources are based on the Northern branch of the Broth-
erhood pipeline that enters the country from Slovakia and quickly splits into 
two further lines, both aimed at the German border- A major spur supplies 
Moravia and connects to the Polish network at Český Těšín / Cieszyn. Domes-
tic production is now quite small but several fields as well as other geological 
structures have been turned into a flourishing storage industry that provides 
reserve and flexibility services not only to the Czech Republic but also to neigh-
bouring countries, notably Germany.
Market openness mostly depends on the availability of firm capacity from 
Germany, which has allowed several companies to compete with supplies 
based on relatively cheaper gas available in Western European hubs. It is in-
teresting to notice that this has also seen the participation of Russian based 
companies, which have not been shy of competing on price, based on its own 
resources. The decision to develop firm capacity in the reverse direction to 
the main Brotherhood flow has been crucial to allow reduced dependence on 
Eastern supplies. This has been further reinforced recently by the opening 
of the Gazelle link between the two Czech Republic-Germany border points 
(Hora Sv. Kateriny and Waidhaus), which is not normally aimed at the Czech 
market but helps improving security of supply, as it provides a different route 
for Russian gas. 
Another pilot initiative that has helped the connection of the Czech Republic to 
the German market is the one stop shop capacity product connecting the Czech 
and the bordering German TSO (Ontras) across the HSK IP. This product has 
been recently extended to Slovak Eustream's network, thereby putting the 
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Czech Republic at the centre of one of the most advanced developments of the 
EU capacity market, as it is an example of capacity allocation along a route en-
compassing several TSOs.. 
As a consequence of these developments the Czech Republic has the lowest 
wholesale market concentration among the V4 (see Table 3 below). Lately retail 
competition has been also developing quickly and the switching rate of smaller 
customers has dramatically increased in the last two years to over 11%. 
Whereas the Czech market has the lowest dependence from Russian supplies 
among the V4, it is still not connected to any other sources than the “Western 
mix” as it can be found in the German NCG and Gaspool hubs. Connection to 
other sources, e.g. on the Mediterranean coast is very remote due to the limited 
surplus of gas in Italy and some reported difficulties in the reverse flow usage 
of the Slovak-Austrian connection.
Further reasons for the relative success of liberalisation are probably to be 
found in the early choice of privatising the industry, which reduces the risk 
of collusion between industry on one side and government and regulators on 
the other, but also the possibility by government to influence pricing the pri-
vate choices of the industry. The reduced concentration of the distribution sec-
tor also helped, as each local retail supplier has an interest in actively seeking 
cheaper supplies to cater to its relatively loyal customers, and possibly also in 
competing in distribution zones other than its original home base. Finally, any 
end user price regulation has been abolished for over seven years, which cer-
tainly encourages the entry of new competitors.
End user prices are among the lowest in the region and below those of Western 
neighbours for industrial customers, but they are relatively high for the resi-
dential market (see Figures 3-6). The Czech case may represent an example of 
the effects of full end user price liberalisation, which is to some extent feared 
in the other V4 countries.
Despite the positive developments of competition some improvements have 
been suggested for the Czech market. First, even if the availability of resourc-
es is currently abundant in neighbouring German hubs, they cannot be used 
for balancing purposes. In fact the Czech Republic – like the other V4 coun-
tries - does not have a proper balancing market yet and imbalances are subject 
to administrative penalties that are linked to prices recorded at the German 
EEX exchange. The Czech market operator (OTE) has developed a platform for 
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intra-day trade that is used by market players to achieve balancing require-
ments, including through a monthly ex-post trading of tolerances. Such a plat-
form for short term trading is unique in the region. However this market is 
very small (dealing between 10-20 mcm/year) and is regarded as too small and 
shallow. On the other hand, physically remote markets like the NCG are hardly 
useful for balancing purposes. 
Regarding infrastructure, some difficulties are reported only in Northern 
Moravia, where the reinforcement of the existing pipeline capacity is expect-
ed. This is actually the line that connects the Czech Republic with Poland and 
its reinforcement could also lead to that of the Czech-Polish IP: according to 
TSO Net4Gas' Ten Year Development Plan this interconnection should be up-
graded from the current 0.5 to 2.5-3 bcm/year. More recent plans, embodied in 
the latest ENTSOG Ten Years Network Development Plan (published in Febru-
ary 2013) foresee further expansions. Net4Gas and Gaz-System plan to build 
a second IP with a capacity of 6.5 bcm/y from the Czech Republic to Poland  and 
5 in the opposite direction. In a later stage a further upgrade of capacity up to 10 
bcm/y in the direction from CZ to PL is planned. Further plans have been en-
visaged for connection with Austria, aimed at bypassing both the limitations of 
the Austrian-Slovakian IP and those of the Baumgarten -Oberkappel pipeline 
(WAG). The current AT-SK link is regarded as not fully adequate to bring new 
supplies into the Czech Republic that may come from the Southern Corridor or 
the Mediterranean.
3. hungary
Hungary has a very mature gas market, based on a century old oil and gas in-
dustry. Domestic fields are still being exploited and provide about 20% of cur-
rent domestic requirements. Imports from the former Soviet Union were start-
ed in the 1970s from a section of the Brotherhood pipeline that branches off 
in Western Ukraine, not far from the Slovak border. This branch is also used 
to supply Serbia and through it Bosnia and Herzegovina, however this transit 
activity amount to nearly 2 bcm/year only and is therefore far smaller than in 
the other V4 countries. 
On the other hand Hungary has the highest reliance on natural gas for its pri-
mary energy requirement (over 40%), due to its limited coal resources. Con-
sumption is evenly distributed between industry, power generation and the 
residential sector. Therefore, it is also very sensitive to security of supply as 
well as gas price issues. After peaking at over 13 bcm in 2005, consumption has 
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recently declined to just over 10, falling notably in the power sector, where it 
has been suffering from the competition of imports based on coal or nuclear 
generation. The fall has also been related to the poor macroeconomic perfor-
mance of the country in the global crisis, which has been the worst in CEE.
Hungary has been very active in the development of infrastructure, starting 
with the Austrian link (HAG), which normally supplies gas of Eastern ori-
gin but connects the country directly to the West. As such, it turned out to 
be extremely useful during the January 2009 crisis, when the country barely 
avoided cutting residential customers. After that event Hungary enhanced 
its infrastructure activity, building connections to Romania and Croatia and 
promoting that with Slovakia. It also built a special strategic storage site for 
emergencies. 
Hungary was an early case of ownership unbundling as MOL, the national oil 
and gas company, sold its gas supply interests and the related Russian supply 
contracts to Germany's E.ON in 2005. European competition authorities re-
quired that about 15% of the supplies should be auctioned annually, thereby 
providing the basis for other suppliers. The largest Russian supply contract ex-
pires in 2015 and Hungary is currently debating its renewal.
After privatisation MOL itself re-entered the market as storage operator as 
well as producer and minority trader. The distribution sector also became 
a source of competition after unbundling, as the four main companies (cover-
ing about 98% of the market) were totally or partially sold and became the mar-
ket bridgehead for a few Western European gas giants (ENI, GdF-Suez, RWE). 
Lately competition has extended to smaller customers and switching rates ex-
ceeding 10% / year have been reported, in line with Western European cases. 
Nearly 50 traders are now active, with  some of them using a “pure trading” 
license that does not allow direct sale to end users. 
However, market liquidity remains inadequate due to insufficient diversity of 
supplies, as in the rest of CEE. A related problem is that of take or pay contracts, 
which have suffered due to a decline in consumption, and whose costs are ulti-
mately paid by all end customers.
Limited liquidity also affects the balancing market that has been started but 
is jeopardised by the lack of adequate information provided on shippers' po-
sitions and by the relatively low penalties, which are often much lower than 
the bid/ask spreads on the market. Liquidity is also low due to scant supply 
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diversity and far lower transit flows, which have triggered a flourishing bal-
ancing market in neighbouring Austria
After the 2009 crisis the construction of an interconnection with Slovakia 
has become a major issue, as those with Romania and Croatia are currently 
supporting the export mode only. On the other hand, the HAG is very often 
congested after Western European hub prices started to diverge from those of 
oil based long term contracts, but cannot be reinforced due to difficulties on 
the Austrian side. Moreover, capacity on this connection is partly reserved 
for the incumbent, in relation to its universal service obligations towards 
protected customers. The Romanian export ban may be lifted soon as it is 
subject to European infringement procedure, and the two countries' TSOs 
are actively working, in collaboration with NRAs, to offer a pilot bundled ca-
pacity product.
The much expected supply diversification through the Nabucco pipeline has 
long been postponed and the same has happened to the proposed Croatian LNG 
terminal. FGSZ, the MOL-controlled TSO, has launched an open season proce-
dure in cooperation with its Slovakian counterpart, but this has failed to reach 
the required booking level. A second attempt failed later despite more favour-
able conditions, possibly due to the perception that the Hungarian government 
was committed to the investment anyway. 
Meanwhile, the government has signed an MoU that will allow the transit of 
the Russian supported South Stream pipeline across Hungarian territory. This 
is regarded as a diverification of routes, but not of suppliers.
Lately following E.ON's decision to leave the Hungarian market and the intro-
duction of tight price controls on residential and small industry prices as well 
as on network margins, the government has promoted a partial re-nationalisa-
tion of the industry. The Slovakian link will be built by a new TSO controlled by 
MVM, the state owned power utility, which will also shortly take over E.ON's 
trading and storage businesses. The regulatory status of the new TSO is yet 
to be defined. In any case with its 5 bcm/year capacity this link is expected to 
allow for much tighter integration of Hungary with its Northern and Western 
neighbours and possibly to help increase supply diversity.
It is reported that the price controls on residential and SME markets may have 
been accompanied by a partial reduction of available capacity on the Western 
border, which is in fact normally congested. The need to recover costs and 
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limited competition may have led to a price increase in the larger industrial 
customers' market, which is apparent in Figures 3 and 4. Such reallocation 
of costs and margins from the residential to the industrial market could be 
a problem for gas suppliers in the country after market integration, as new-
comers equipped with cheaper supplies and no USP obligations may sweep the 
industrial and power generation market and deepen the losses of those with 
USP obligations. For that reason the price controls on end user customers are 
likely to be at least adjusted after market integration. 
Access to diverse supplies remains a major issue in Hungary as well as in other 
V4 and other neighbouring countries. Hopes are based on access to larger sup-
plies from Western hubs through the new link with Slovakia, overcoming the 
bottleneck of the HAG; on access to Caspian resources through Nabucco West 
(or less favourably through TAP and IAP), and to connections with LNG re-
sources to be landed in Croatia or Poland. For these reasons, Hungary remains 
deeply committed to the deployment of the NSC as well as to V4 integration.
4. Poland
In Poland, the role of natural gas has been a relatively minor one and per capita 
consumption is the lowest in the V4 and among the lowest in Europe (Table 1): 
this is a consequence of the predominance of cheap local coal in the country's 
energy industry. In fact this low development is now a major opportunity, as 
policies aimed at reducing local, regional and global pollution are expected to 
trigger a major gas for coal substitution process. Moreover, the Polish economy 
is in a relatively buoyant state and has suffered less than the rest of Europe 
from the recent global crisis. Thus, Poland is one of the few EU countries where 
a significant gas demand growth is expected: from the current 1515.4 bcm in 
2011 to 24 by 2020 and up to 32 by 2030. The actual outcome could of course be 
affected in case the large estimated Polish unconventional gas resources start 
being produced, which would increase gas competitiveness and foster its take-
over of the energy market.
On the other hand, Poland is among the least advanced EU Member States in 
terms of market liberalisation. In fact diversification of suppliers only started 
less than two years ago, and the incumbent, state owned PGNiG has a market 
share around 95%. Moreover, over 70% of the gas comes from a single direc-
tion. As a consequence of this near monopoly situation gas prices are currently 
regulated at retail level, and were regulated even at wholesale level until very 
recently. Yet their level is relatively low, because the country boasts a relevant 
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domestic production, and prices are set at a weighted average level between 
them and those of imports.
The market model has been recently innovated. An entry-exit tariff system 
and a virtual exchange point have been established, with a gas exchange which 
has been operational since January 2013. Although its liquidity is still negligi-
ble, there is a plan to boost it by requiring that a substantial part of gas sales be 
channelled through the exchange.  
Other difficulties for the development of the Polish market are its limited ac-
cess to supplies other than from Russia (through either Belarus or Ukraine). 
Very limited competition has started due to the reinforcement of the Lasów IP 
from Germany (1.5 bcm/year), the Cieszyn IP from the Czech republic (0.5) and 
the virtual reverse interruptible capacity on the Yamal pipeline at Mallnow. 
The opening of the Mallnow interconnection for reverse flow is a positive out-
come of the agreements that have brought the Polish section of the Yamal pipe-
line under the Polish TSO's (GAZ-SYSTEM) control and its access rules into 
compliance with EU legislation. Even though this has allowed the sale of vir-
tual reverse flow capacity, it is not regarded as a sound basis for a competitive 
challenge, due to its interruptibility, but as a useful integration of other sup-
plies. Polish and German governments and regulators and the concerned TSOs 
have already agreed on turning some of the reverse flow capacity into firm one, 
which is also required for the implementation of the EU security of supply reg-
ulation (Reg. 994/2010/EC)5. In other words part of the current virtual reverse 
flow capacity would be turned into physical reverse flow by adding compres-
sion, notably on the German side.
The Polish wholesale market has not been very attractive so far not only be-
cause of its price regulatory status and its nearly monopolistic structure, but 
also because of the composition of demand6. In fact most of the distribution 
market, amounting to over 80% of the total, is controlled by the incumbent and 
5 Moreover, some difficulties currently occur due to the very different capacity allocation 
regime across the border. Germany uses auctions, whereas Poland allocates pro-rata. This 
is understandable as auctions are risky when the power of market players is heavily imbal-
anced. This problem will be automatically solved when the new European capacity alloca-
tion Network Code is implemented, but it may generate some difficulties in the transition.
6 It is claimed by stakeholders that regulated end user prices may not be cost reflective but 
cross-subsidize larger customers, worsening the entry difficulties of newcomers. It is be-
yond the scope of the present study to assess the  validity of this statement.
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direct access to small customers is notoriously very difficult in the early stages 
of market liberalisation. The role of gas fired power generation is very small in 
Poland due to abundant and cheap local coal resources, hence the only really 
contestable market consists of heavy industry and is not large7.
Considering the limited excess capacity and the lack of diversification, and 
with demand expected increase, it is not surprising that the Polish govern-
ment and TSO are planning major infrastructure enhancements. In particular 
these should include:
•	 the LNG terminal in Świnoujście, underpinned by a long term contract 
with Qatar and capable of producing up to 5 bcm/y of natural gas, expected 
to be operational in 2014and possibly extended to 7.5 bcm/y later;
•	 the strengthening of the Cieszyn IP, which may reach 2.5-3 bcm/y accord-
ing to plans already included in the Czech TSO's but it may be increased to 
10 pursuant to the EU-wide Ten Years Development Plan;
•	 the construction of an interconnector with Slovakia from South-Eastern 
Poland, able to transport 4.7 bcm/year from Poland to Slovakia and 5.7 bcm/
year (extendable to 9.5) in the opposite direction.. This would be tightly con-
nected with the scheduled Slovakia-Hungary pipeline (see below), thereby 
ensuring full physical interconnection of the V4 region.
A different role could be played by the proposed interconnection between 
Poland and Lithuania. This is also a project of major EU interest as it would 
eliminate the isolation of the Baltic Republics, and potentially also of Fin-
land, with 2017 as a tentative commissioning target. However given the exist-
ing proposals of new LNG terminals in Lithuania and Latvia and the limited 
market size (less than 10 bcm/year including Finland) over a sparsely popu-
lated region it is dubious what the economic rationale for this proposal could 
be, and the cost allocation between the countries concerned and the EU itself 
could still be a matter of some discussion. It is anyway clear that such inter-
connection may enlarge the market size of the V4 but not provide any new 
7 A further difficulty that has slowed down retail competition has been the lack of a rucksack 
principle on the allocation of capacity at transmission system exits or city gates. Capacity 
remained with the incumbent rather than being automatically transferred to the new sup-
plier, as normally happens in Europe. This issue is expected to be solved soon by transfer-
ring city gates capacity to distributors.
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sources, with the partial exception of those available through a Lithuanian 
or Latvian LNG terminal. 
The agreed policy in Poland calls for the development of new infrastructure, 
wherever possible with the help of shippers' money. In fact, the opening of the 
existing interconnection with the Czech Republic has been underpinned by 
three long term capacity contracts. On the other hand, no market test or open 
season aimed to ascertain the availability of shippers for the financing of new 
interconnections or reinforcements has been launched yet. Remarkable inter-
est certainly exists for a stronger interconnection with Germany, and the rein-
forcement of physical reverse flow on the Yamal pipeline. As for Southern con-
nections to the Czech Republic and Slovakia, some interest has been detected 
on the Polish side but the situation has not been regarded as mature for private 
interest funded developments8. 
Besides interconnections, the Polish system requires substantial internal in-
vestment notably to enhance connection between the country's Northern and 
Southern regions. This is also a part of the NSC, which would be necessary to 
connect the Polskie LNG terminal to the other V4 countries.
Storage is also relatively limited. Figure 7 shows storage working gas plot-
ted against 2010 consumption. The interpolation line shows (on a logarithmic 
scale) the “rule of thumb” by which this should be around 25% of annual con-
sumption. Poland is clearly short of storage, whereas other V4 countries are 
“long”. In fact, the complementary storage situation, with relatively abundant 
resources in all countries but lack of them in the largest national market (Po-
land) is another important driver of V4 integration. If the regional gas market 
model proposed in BEMIP for the Baltic States is implemented and a link be-
tween Poland and Lithuania is built, storage opportunities in Latvia will also 
be taken into account. 
8 It is worth noting that this situation is by no means peculiar to V4 countries, but it is rather 
a by-product of current market and (especially) general environmental and energy policy 
uncertainties that do not allow for reliable forecasts of gas demand development, notably in 
the power sector.
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5. Slovakia
Slovakia is the smallest V4 country in terms of population and gas market 
size. It has a very mature market with a high gasification level (2nd in Europe 
after the Netherlands). Only limited consumption increase is expected from 
economic growth and partial replacement of other fuels in power and heat 
generation.
The peculiar characteristic of the Slovakian gas industry is its transit role. In 
fact it is home to the largest gas transmission system in Europe, with a capac-
ity of over 90 bcm/year, nearly 15 times as large as the domestic consumption, 
transporting Russian gas towards Western destinations. This system splits 
not far from Slovakia's western borders, with a Northern branch crossing into 
the Czech Republic at Lanžhot and a southern branch heading for the Austri-
an Baumgarten hub. As a consequence of this interconnection capacity with 
Western neighbouring countries is very large.
Domestic production is now negligible, but some fields have been turned into 
storage sites that are large compared to the country's requirements and sell 
their services to neighbouring countries as well, mostly Austria and the Czech 
Republic. 
The high relevance of transit has been a major source of benefits as well as 
woes for the Slovak gas industry. For many years it has brought remarkable 
transit fees, which have been a major source of hard currency for the country. 
On the other hand the dominance of Russian gas flows has discouraged any 
supply diversity perspective, hence Slovakia's reliance on Russian imports 
is the highest among the V4. This became a major problem in January 2009, 
when the interruption of all flows through Ukraine led to serious service dis-
ruption. In spite of storage and limited inflows from the West all industrial 
customers had to be cut off and the resulting damage has been estimated at 
around 1 billion euros. After this event, security of gas supply has become 
a high level priority for Slovakia, and the construction of the direct connec-
tions to Poland and Hungary has been decided on. Despite some difficulties in 
the process (see section 2.3 above) the construction of the Hungarian inter-
connector is now advanced, with procurement completed, and it is expected 
to be operational by 2015, with a capacity of nearly 5 bcm/year. The Polish link 
is expected to complete its feasibility study later in 2013, but the routing has 
not yet been agreed between the two countries. In any case both projects – and 
the whole NSC – are expected to obtain a high rating among the European 
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Projects of Common Interest (PCI) envisaged by the Infrastructure package 
currently under discussion in Brussels.
The 2009 interruption has also led to the enhancement of reverse flow capacity 
in the pipelines connecting the Czech Republic and Austria. This has increased 
the possibility of swaps and the activation of commercial flows from the West, 
which has boosted competitive supplies: in the last two years the incumbent 
has seen its market share shrinking, notably in favour of large companies based 
in Germany. Some 16 suppliers have been recorded. The reverse flow capacity 
increase is also expected to have solved at least the short term SoS problems.
Moreover, strengthened (though not fully satisfactory) capacity is allowing 
the Slovakian TSO to use the Austrian Baumgarten hub for its balancing pur-
poses. This represents the basis for a common balancing market, even though 
the Slovak balancing system is not yet market based but it is entirely under the 
responsibility of the TSO.
On the other hand, the frequent disputes between Russia and Ukraine have 
led to a different development that is a major threat for the Slovak gas indus-
try. The construction of the Nord Stream pipeline that directly connects Russia 
and Germany under the Baltic sea, together with the slump in Western Euro-
pean gas consumption, have led to a slow but steady decline of transit flows. 
The possible construction of South Stream may further exacerbate the fall of 
Slovak transit and Eustream, the Slovak TSO, is already planning to reduce its 
capacity. On this issue little can be done by Eustream, except possibly promot-
ing a more aggressive pricing strategy. On the other hand this development is 
also probably reinforcing the urgency of promoting different flows, with the 
North-South axis partly replacing East-West.
Slovak industry has recently gone through a major ownership change. The 
government had been early sold 49% of the formerly integrated incumbent 
(SPP) to E.ON and GdF-Suez, with a clause that the management would be con-
trolled by the buyers. Lately the two western companies sold their shares to 
Czech international group EPH. It is too early to say how this change will af-
fect the strategies of SPP or of its affiliated transmission subsidiary Eustream. 
In any case, strong support for the development of the NSC appears unchal-
lenged in Slovakia.
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6. Concluding remarks: the V4 countries and the development  
of market integration
Infrastructure, and in particular interconnection between all V4 countries, is 
the necessary foundation of any integrated market development. At present 
only the Czech Republic and Slovakia have adequate interconnection capac-
ity and are sufficiently independent from supplies from (or through) the for-
mer Soviet Union (see Table 2). However, plans for new infrastructure would 
lead to remarkably higher interconnection, which would be probably sufficient 
to implement a common market and possibly also a single balancing zone, al-
though more detailed studies are needed here.
The V4 decision to cooperate for the exploitation of these opportunities is clearly 
justified. The GTM studies have noticed that investments aimed at certain mar-
ket areas are boosted by the availability of a liquid and reasonably competitive 
market9. In turn this requires a market size of al least 20 bcm/year and the avail-
ability of at least three different sources, with a reasonably low market concen-
tration (i.e. an HHI index around 2000). None of the V4 countries can achieve 
these conditions at present. Without the NSC and V4 integration, the availability 
of three different sources is possible only indirectly through “backhaul” sup-
plies from the West, which are often interruptible and therefore less reliable. 
Theoretically, only Poland may have the capacity of achieving the required 
GTM standards in coming years, although through LNG supplies that may be 
rather costly in the short term: in fact the LNG supplies have been contracted 
at a time when their price was not particularly favourable, due to competition 
from East Asian demand. Achieving an acceptably competitive level of the HHI 
would also require and a very dramatic fall of the incumbent’s market share, 
probably to below 30%, which could probably be achieved only by an aggressive 
(an unlikely) gas release programme.
The difficulties of achieving a secure and competitive gas market in a single 
country (including the largest V4 country) show the benefit of integrating all 
V4 countries into a single relevant market: a common V4 market would allow 
the achievement of at least two such conditions (market size and concentra-
tion) without major efforts, with a slower phasing in of competition between 
the current national market leaders – as has mostly happened in Western 
9 Jean–Michel Glachant, “A Vision for the EU Target Model: the MECO-S Model”, EUI Work-
ing Paper RSCAS 2011/38. www.florence-school.eu
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Europe in the last decade, possibly fostered by limited gas release programmes. 
It would also help achieving the expansion of new supplies by triggering in-
vestment in new connections.
In order to see how V4 integration could help achieve the GTM objectives, Fig-
ure 8 and Table 2 can be considered. Figure 8 depicts the state of infrastructure 
as it it could appear around 2018, including infrastructure that is is expected 
to be commissioned by that time, including Nabucco and LNG terminals in Po-
land and (possibly) Croatia. Table 2 shows how the connection of the V4 mar-
kets would modify market concentration indices, assuming that current mar-
ket players kept their sales and new capacity would be assigned in line with 
the present shares of current capacity holders in each country. An integrated 
market would probably lead to market players entering each other's markets, 
and new players also intervening, as has happened already in Western Europe 
and to some extent in the V4 countries as well. Hence concentration would fall 
further. Such calculation is purely hypothetical as connection is scant, but it 
shows how market power would fall if interconnection was provided.
Table 2. Market concentration indicators in Visegrad countries, 2011
Czech Rep. hungary Poland Slovakia V4
C3 59% 82% 97% 95% 78%
HHI 3905 5121 9029 6199 2537
Source: NRA Liquidity Reports; own estimations for Hungary and V4
On the other hand, it is clear that, whereas all stakeholders in the V4 have con-
firmed their interest and commitment towards integration, it is also clear that 
such interest is not the same across the region. In fact, Poland has the lowest 
supply capacity independent from FSU supplies (Western imports and domestic 
production), followed by Hungary (Table 3). Both countries fall short of the N-1 
criteria for security of supply, even though they respect the narrower official N-1 
definition that is included in Regulation 994/2010/EC, which is based on daily 
rather than annual capacity10. Yet this definition is clearly unsatisfactory for the 
countries' energy policy, which looks at diversity of supply with a view to ensure 
competition between supplies and lower prices as a consequence.
10 By such definition storage can be used to satisfy emergency needs.
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 Table 3. Non-FSU bound annual firm capacity as % of annual consumption
2011 2018 (exp.)
Czech Republic 197.3% 190.9%
hungary 62.0% 121.3%
Poland 37.9% 110.5%
Slovakia 242.3% 365.8%
V4 107.6% 166.9%
Source: own calculations based on ENTSOG data
For these reasons, it is clear that the greatest infrastructure development ef-
fort would fall on countries with lower alternative supply capacity. In particu-
lar, Poland is called to the greatest effort to substantially reduce its near isola-
tion, and even more so as its consumption is expected to substantially grow. As 
for Hungary, it has already developed remarkable interconnection, but needs 
to complete its work by connecting with Slovakia and ensuring flow reversal 
on its Croatian and Romanian borders11. 
The Czech Republic has a limited interest in the development of infrastructure 
as a way of satisfying its security of supply requirements. On the other hand, 
the limited infrastructure that the Czech Republic is expected to develop (i.e. 
the enhancement of its Polish link) is largely necessary anyway for domestic 
reasons. As for Slovakia, its opportunities depend largely on its peculiar posi-
tion as the home of the largest transit flows in Europe: experience has shown 
that in spite of large connections its security of supply may not be fully grant-
ed, as bottlenecks further west may limit the amount of gas that can actually 
reach the country. For these reasons, the country appears firmly committed to 
boost its connections with Hungary and Poland, as a crucial part of the NSC. 
A REKK study12 shows that the construction of such interconnections could 
in principle drive wholesale prices of the V4 countries close to each other and 
close to those prevailing in Western Europe. Section 5 will further analyse 
11 This analysis does not consider the contribution of new major transit projects like Nabucco 
West and South Stream, which by their nature are beyond the control of the V4 policy makers.
12 P. Kaderjak, see fn. 2.
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how the market organisation may better exploit the availability of such new 
interconnections.
Three of the V4 countries have started to operate their national central gas 
markets. Even though it may seem early for an assessment, at least the Czech 
case shows that they are probably too small and endowed with too limited li-
quidity resources, despite good interconnection with Western hubs. It is prob-
ably necessary for the V4 to either merge their short term markets or to ar-
range some permanent cooperation (e.g. market coupling) in order to mobilise 
and pool their resources. In turn, Slovakia has so far preferred to refer to the 
neighbouring Austrian hub. 
Emerging spot markets are also associated with balancing, though in different 
ways in the three countries. Since balancing is at the same time a possible trig-
ger of spot markets and a major reason to establish them, it is clear that some 
harmonisation of the relationship between balancing and market organisation 
is absolutely necessary. Most stakeholders agree with this view. The substan-
tial changes that will be necessary due to the implementation of the European 
balancing network code are a major chance to promote such a harmonisation. 
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III. ChAllENgES AND OPPORTuNITIES
The V4 countries share common problems, notably their persistent high de-
pendence on Russian supplies, entailing limited security of supply standards 
and relatively higher prices if compared to those of Western Europe. Yet their 
collaboration in the gas sector occurs at a time the gas market faces important 
changes, which are sources of challenges as well as of opportunities for the V4 
countries. These are now briefly described and discussed, with a view to un-
derline the main reasons that highlight the benefits of developing the North-
South Gas Corridor in Central and Eastern Europe and of integrating the V4 gas 
markets.
1. The Polish lNg terminal
The main source of the current decoupling between spot market prices and 
those of oil-indexed long term contracts that still dominate V4 supplies lies 
in the LNG that has been rather abundantly available as a consequence of the 
largely unexpected shale gas revolution in North America. Declining or stag-
nating gas demand in Western Europe has added to this opportunity and some 
part of the bonanza has reached the V4 through the limited available West-East 
capacity. 
However, the V4 countries may shortly exploit this opportunity through the 
new LNG terminal in Świnoujście, Poland (Polskie LNG). It has been claimed 
that gas from LNG terminals can also be shipped to the V4 through existing 
facilities in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, however it can be shown that 
this would be a more expensive option. For example the total cost of shipping 
gas from an African or Middle Eastern source to end customers in Prague or 
Warsaw would be 0.20-0.40 $/Mbtu higher than through the Świnoujście ter-
minal, if the LNG had to be landed and regasified in the Netherlands. Costs 
could be even larger in case of congestion or tougher competition on any link 
in the supply chain. Direct re-gasification in CEE rather than through Western 
facilities and networks certainly represents an asset for V4 customers. 
2. The Southern gas (fourth) Corridor
More could be done with new transmission infrastructure, opening supplies 
from gas-rich regions on the South-Eastern neighbourhoods of Europe. Large 
pipeline projects from the East may bring into the V4 region (notably in Hunga-
ry) new supplies through the South Stream, Nabucco West or Trans Albanian 
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Pipeline (TA) projects. Among them South Stream – which is expected to cross 
Hungary – would be only a route rather than source diversification for the V4, 
much in the same way as the Nord Stream, Opal and Gazelle pipelines allow 
supplies of Russian gas to reach the Czech Republic through the Baltic and 
Germany rather than through Ukraine and Slovakia. Nabucco West and TAP 
are currently seen as alternative ways of bringing part of the gas produced at 
Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field to Europe. A choice between them is expected by 
mid 2013. 
This would be the first implementation of the EU's long pursued policy of pro-
moting a Fourth (or “Southern”) Corridor of gas imports, with supplies from the 
gas rich Caspian and Middle Eastern regions. Whatever the chosen route, the 
mid term development that is expected is rather limited: only 10 bcm/year of 
Shah Deniz production is allocated to Europe, hence its contribution will be lim-
ited. Although the V4 are in an excellent position as front-line purchasers of such 
gas, their shares will be presumably even lower. Yet, there are hopes that South-
ern gas corridors supplies may increase at a later stage through other possible 
sources that are in the ground but not currently available for various reasons 
(e.g. Turkmenistan, Iran, Northern Iraq, East Mediterranean offshore).
Nabucco West is clearly the best option for the V4 as it directly crosses 
Hungarian territory and is expected to terminate at the Austrian Slova-
kian IP in Baumgarten. It is the most direct and cheapest way of bringing 
Caspian gas to the V4, but not necessarily to Western Europe: this could 
be the reason for its postponement. In case TAP is preferred as the first 
Fourth Corridor option, some gas could still indirectly reach the V4 through 
the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP), a spur off the TAP linking Albania with 
Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, with the latter already con-
nected to Hungary. The construction of the IAP is a political goal of the En-
ergy Community of South-Eastern Europe and a part of the project of better 
gasifying the Western Balkans. It is likely that any available quantities for 
the V4 would be rather small.
3. New market players
Expiration of long term contracts with the traditional suppliers and / or their 
renegotiation will naturally occur, and the trend towards shorter term, less oil 
related contracts could substantially alter the competitive conditions in the V4 
as well as in other EU markets. A possible development is that traditional up-
stream suppliers could decide to enter the wholesale markets: a chance that is 
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easier for Russian companies in the V4 rather than in other European regions, 
due to historical links. The last few years have indeed seen a remarkable in-
crease of the number and relevance of new suppliers in the V4, with the maxi-
mum impact in the CR and minimum in Poland. It is worth noting that this 
behaviour does not exclude companies that use (commercial) Russian gas, and 
that are ready to compete for customers even at prices that are below those of 
the traditional long term contracts. Furthermore there are several indicators 
showing that Russia may be considering changing its attitude towards mar-
kets to avoid losing further market share. This is therefore an important op-
portunity for V4 markets, notably if interconnections between them and along 
the new NSC eliminate the possibility of segmenting and addressing the V4 
markets separately.  
4. The European Network Codes
More generally, the implementation of European Network Codes starting in 
2014 represents an opportunity for a major review of market regulation, which 
could be the chance to harmonize it within the V4 region, with a view to estab-
lish a common market. The implementation of the ENCs, which are now being 
developed after the Framework Guidelines issued by the ACER and approved 
by the European Commission, is expected to occur mostly between 2014 and 
2016. In the gas sector, four ENCs are being issued (Capacity Allocation, Bal-
ancing, Interoperability and Data Exchange Rules, Harmonization of Tariff 
Structures), and rules on Congestion Management have already been approved 
by a fast-track procedure and included in an Annex to Regulation 715/2009/EC. 
Yet, all these rules normally require few changes in primary legislation, but 
a significant production and harmonization of secondary legislation, involving 
mostly NRAs and TSOs. Section 5 below will provide further details and exam-
ples of the rules to be issued in relation to the chosen market model.
The implementation of new ENCs is an opportunity for V4 harmonisation, and 
also for the work of NRAs and TSOs. ENCs will leave several options to choose 
from, and detailed rules will have to be tailored to each market. This is likely 
to require a strong effort and heavily stress the limited resources of TSOs and 
– even more – NRAs. A way to relieve the efforts and achieve better quality 
results is a regional division of labour. For example, each TSO and NRA could 
be assigned to a task force led by a V4 country NRA and TSO: the task force 
leader would bear the greatest effort on implementation of the ENC, though 
with the consent of its partners. In this way, a harmonised implementation of 
ENCs would also lead to better quality market rules.
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5. further opportunities
Less certain but potentially even larger potential for the V4 market could be 
obtained from other sources. These are regrouped here due to their relatively 
more uncertain outlook and / or their location outside (but close to) the V4. Ex-
ploitation of these opportunities could be related to success of the V4 integra-
tion, but is by no means a pre-condition for it:
•	 Mediterranean	LNG.	The implementation of the ENC, of the SoS Regula-
tion No. 994/2010 and of the recently adopted EU Congestion Management 
rules may help open up pipeline capacity with interconnected LNG termi-
nals. The rather recent story of V4 connection with Western European hubs 
could teach several lessons on the relevance of this opportunity. For several 
years after gas market liberalisation had started, the large East-West transit 
pipelines that transported Russian gas across the V4 countries could not be 
used in any other way, as capacity was fully booked and no physical or vir-
tual reverse service was available. However, notably after the January 2009 
supply crisis that stopped transport through Ukraine for two weeks, things 
have changed. In spite of the difficulties of arranging capacity across several 
different TSOs some gas has been made available and is now the source of 
any substantial market liberalisation as well as diversity of supply in the V4 
region, with the Czech Republic as the best beneficiary. Likewise, similar 
opportunities exist in the Southern part of the V4 region: LNG terminals in 
Turkey and Greece have spare capacity and pipelines across Bulgaria and 
Romania could accommodate some virtual reverse flow gas that could reach 
Hungary. Planned investment may also turn part of such capacity into 
physical capacity. Although several difficulties currently hamper these ini-
tiatives, it is possible that the entry into force of new Network Codes on Con-
gestion Management and Capacity Allocation, as well as enhanced capacity 
aimed at meeting the security of supply standards required by Regulation 
994/2010/EC may open up new opportunities, based on existing infrastruc-
ture, as they already did in the case of connections between Poland and the 
Czech Republic with Western Europe.
•	 Other	North-African	gas. Some more gas could also come through the Ital-
ian LNG terminals and the Austrian TAG pipeline into the Baumgarten IP 
with Slovakia or the HAG into Hungary. This opportunity has been a minor 
one so far as the Italian market has suffered from inadequate or costly LNG 
logistics and generally poor competitive conditions, which have led to pre-
mium prices with respect to those prevalent at Baumgarten, and even more 
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at North-Western hubs. However this situation is now changing, with more 
alignment of Italian prices with those of NW Europe. The next opening of 
another (though small) Italian LNG terminal and new pipeline and projects 
on the Mediterranean coast could increase the Italian market surplus, also 
in the wake of its persistently weak demand, yet the weight of this oppor-
tunity should not be large. The Italian TSO has also announced plans to re-
inforce South-North capacity towards Switzerland-Germany and Austria.
•	 New	 production	 opportunities	 in	 the	 region	 and	 in	 the	 neighbouring	
countries,	notably	 from	unconventional	gas	plays. Poland is widely re-
garded as a major potential source of shale gas, even though recent esti-
mates have been re-estimated at 350-750 bcm, much lower levels than ear-
lier expectations13. However these estimates may not adequately consider 
more recent activities. The Polish shale potential is a very important topic 
that lies beyond the scope of the present Report. And is still subject to sig-
nificant forecasting instability. Further resources in the Czech Republic are 
currently frozen by a moratorium. Remarkable unconventional resources 
are also expected in Ukraine.
•	 Connection	to	the	North	Sea	continental	shelf	through	the	Baltic. Fairly 
detailed projects had been defined for a connection between Norway and 
Poland via Denmark, known as the Skanled and Baltic Pipe projects. How-
ever Skanled was suspended in 2009 due to the general economic crisis 
and the aggressive Danish policy, targeting the phasing out of fossil fuel 
usage by 2050, whereas the Baltic Pipe’s commissioning is now scheduled 
for 2020 only.
•	 New	LNG	terminals	in	the	Balkans.	An important component of the original 
NSC was its Southern end, which was supposed to be represented by its con-
nection with Western Balkans infrastructure. In particular, plans have long 
been put forward for the Adria LNG project, a 10 bcm/year LNG terminal to 
be based on the Croatian Northern Adriatic Krk island. However the Adria 
Consortium has postponed the FID until 2013. Meanwhile the new Hunga-
ry-Croatia link has become operational, though it is not yet bi-directional. 
13 http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/03/23/Lower-Poland-shale-
gas-reserves-estimated/UPI-90051332498600/; F. Geny, “Can Unconventional Gas be a Game 
Changer in European Gas Markets?”, OIES Working Paper, 2011, www.oxfordenergy.org. 
Kosciuszko Institute, “Unconventional Gas – a Chance for Poland and Europe? Analysis and 
Recommendations”, The Kosciuszko Institute, Kraków, 2011, www.ik.org.pl 
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Further pledges have come from Croatian and Hungarian authorities, and 
the Hungarian and Croatian gas industries have consolidated14. Plans have 
also been considered for an LNG terminal in Albania, but these have never 
reached any operational step. On the other hand, South Eastern Europe is 
interested in other major projects, notably Nabucco West, South Stream, 
TAP, IAP, as well as by the Energy Community Gas Ring concept. It is widely 
agreed that not all these project could be borne by the available resources 
and market demand, even considering the remarkable growth potential of 
Western Balkans besides that of the V4. It is likely that a clearer picture of 
the feasibility of these opportunities will appear after a final decision on the 
route for Shah Deniz gas is taken around mid 2013. 
6. Regional cooperation and extension of V4 market integration
All V4 countries are Members of the South-South East European market re-
gion, one of the three into which the Gas Regional Initiative is articulated (GRI 
SSE). It also comprises Italy, Slovenia, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Greece and Croatia as an observer. The V4 countries have important intercon-
nections with other SSE countries, in particular with Austria and Romania, as 
well as with other EU countries, particularly Germany. 
This study is fully aware of the opportunity of extending the process beyond the 
V4 countries, with the inclusions of neighbouring countries, notably of those 
that share the V4 conditions, like the V4's Southern neighbours: Austria, Slove-
nia, Croatia, Romania. These countries are already included not only in the GRI 
SSE but also in bilateral cooperation projects with V4 countries and their in-
clusion (or some form of connection) have been mentioned as useful by several 
V4 stakeholders. Other neighbouring countries (the Baltic Republics, Finland, 
Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) partly share the same situation, but 
have not been mentioned in the same way, probably due to their different ge-
ographical and institutional position or their less advanced market status, so 
that it is likely that integration with such countries appears less close.
The present study is focused on V4 market integration and does not aim at 
providing advice on the opportunity of extending it to other countries. The 
following points that have been raised by stakeholders are brought to the 
readers' attention.
14 http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/hungary-croatia-lng-terminal-adria
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Within the GRI SSE, several pilot projects and studies involving V4 countries 
are currently in preparation. Most of them involve relationships on the East-
West axis:
•	 the GATRAC project between the Czech, the Slovak and a German TSO (On-
tras) allows for the purchase and management of bundled capacity across 
the three borders, through the Lanžhot and Hora Sv. Kateriny IPs;
•	 a bundled capacity allocation project will soon be started on the Lasow IP 
between Poland's Gaz System and Germany's Ontras;
•	 a pilot bundled capacity product is about to launched on the Romania-Hun-
gary interconnection.
Several stakeholders in the Czech and Slovak Republics underline that the es-
tablishment of a common market between their countries and Austria is im-
mediately feasible thanks to existing interconnections and can be the core 
of a CEE gas hub, starting from the Baumgarten Central European Gas Hub 
(CEGH), to be extended later to Hungary, Poland and others. They underline 
the fact that the CEGH has a remarkable experience and market operation ca-
pability and that it is necessary to start developing and expanding hubs as soon 
as possible in the wake of growing competition among European hubs. Two 
studies have been recently published, respectively about the macroeconomic 
benefits and about the features of a joint implementation of the GTM between 
Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
A first study proposes15 that the joint implementation should use the “Trading 
Region” model where a single virtual trading point would be established but 
three separate balancing zones would be maintained (see section 4 for more 
details on this model). 
A second study16 estimates the macroeconomic benefits of the trading region 
by means of the estimation of efficiency improvements arising from alignment 
15 Wagner, Elbling and Co., Design Principles of the CEE Trading Region, Part I, 5 November 
2012; http://www.acer.europa.eu/Gas/Regional_%20Intiatives/South_South-East_GRI/
Pages/GRI-SSE-studies.aspx
16 J. Büchner, O. Floercken, N. Täume, Study on cross-border market integration. Macroeco-
nomic analysis of the CEE Region, E-Bridge Consulting Gmbh, June 2012; http://www.acer.eu-
ropa.eu/Gas/Regional_%20Intiatives/South_South-East_GRI/Pages/GRI-SSE-studies.aspx
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in the region. The net benefits of the Austria-Czech Republic-Slovakia pooling 
are compared and found positive, though lower than those of a single market 
merging Austria and Italy. However these results seem to be crucially depend-
ent on the price differences of Austrian, Italian and other hubs, which have 
been rather volatile, but with a tendency to convergence (Figure 9). 
Other stakeholders note that the inclusion of Austria (and possibly also of Slo-
venia, which is in a similar status) would have positive but limited benefits for 
the V4. It would help due to CEGH advanced market management skills and 
it would also further increase the integrated market size (by about 20%). On 
the other hand, the Austrian system is complex due to the presence of several 
TSOs, which are now trying to be jointly operated through a new coordination 
body (Gas Connect Austria). A new market model has just been introduced, 
hence the experience with the entry-exit model is shorter than in other V4 
countries except Poland. Furthermore, Austria suffers from similar problems 
as the V4: the main supply source is Russia, through long term contracts; Slove-
nia's market is small and buys limited amounts of Algerian gas that is supplied 
through Italy. The independence and neutrality of the CEGH from and towards 
suppliers should also be ensured, as it is currently 50% by Gazprom. For all of 
these reasons, some stakeholders notice that the inclusion of Austria and Slo-
venia would hardly enhance the V4 situation in terms of access to new sources 
and supply diversity. 
Lately Austria, as with the Czech Republic and other V4 countries, has man-
aged to achieve some diversification, with Russia's share of supplies falling 
below 50%. However its main long distance pipelines are among the most con-
gested in Europe as WAG (see Figure 1) and HAG are busy carrying cheaper 
gas eastbound from Western hubs, whereas TAG is used to haul Russian gas 
towards Italy, Slovenia and Croatia. WAG's congestion reduces Austria's appeal 
and indeed tighter connection with the Czech Republic and Slovakia can be 
seen as an attempt to overcome such bottlenecks. 
Connection with Croatia would represent the completion of the NSC. It would 
not greatly increase market size but could in principle provide access to other 
resources if a decision on its long debated LNG terminal is finally taken. This is 
not likely in the current uncertain climate about the European market, but it 
could happen shortly after that.
Romania is home to significant gas reserves, with new finds recently reported 
in the Black Sea. Its market opening has been limited so far by a pricing policy 
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aimed at banning exports and containing the average price paid by domes-
tic consumers by rolling the cheap domestic production, which covers about 
70% of demand, and the Russian imports that fill the difference. Such policy 
is clearly not compatible with actual participation in the European integrated 
market and is the target of an EC infringement procedure. The inclusion of Ro-
mania in larger integrated markets could occur as such policies are overcome, 
but the social situation of the country makes such development likely to occur 
later rather than sooner.
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IV. APPlICAblE hIgh lEVEl MARkET MODElS
There are several basic models that may be considered for the integration of V4 
countries. Some of them can also be combined, or be modified so that they be-
come different development stages rather than alternative solutions. The mod-
els will be discussed in this section, illustrating the main requirements for 
their implementation and the specific issues they may raise in the V4 region.
1. Single cross border market zone
The establishment of a single entry-exit and balancing zone in a region repre-
sents the ideal situation for the achievement of the GTM objectives in terms of 
market size, access to sources and supply concentration. 
This model requires that several necessary conditions are met:
(1) A single tariff system should be established 
In this model, the region has a single entry exit tariff system: in other words 
market participants could pay a single entry tariff in any country or TSO in the 
region and be granted the right to transfer their gas to any other exit point or 
zone in the region. Compared to the current systems, all payments related to 
internal IPs of the region would disappear.
For discussion readers could refer to to hypothetical system of Figure 10, 
where three countries are part of a region. For simplicity of analysis but 
without loss of generality let us assume that each country has its own TSO 
and a national entry-exit system, with a single domestic exit point to local 
distribution as well as large customers that are directly connected to the 
transmission grid. Further there are exit points as IPs (d,e,f,h,i,j); pure en-
try point for import from a producing region or LNG terminal (g), and from 
domestic production (p); and entry/exit points from storage (q, r). In case of 
a full merger, no TSO revenue would accrue from internal IPs (e,h,i). The 
whole tariff system would have to be recalculated and its revenues be redis-
tributed among participating TSOs. 
In principle such a process is simple. If NRAs (independently) define the al-
lowed revenue of their respective TSOs and agree on a cost allocation meth-
odology, a joint tariff system could be defined. Tariffs could then be raised 
by a common entity that would pool and redistribute the revenue in line 
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with the allowed revenues of each TSO. Otherwise (and more simply) each 
TSO would raise the (entry or exit) tariffs in its own jurisdictions and a com-
pensation account would be established for reconciliation with the revenues 
permitted. 
Whereas this is simple in principle, the practical difficulties of the harmoniza-
tion process should not be neglected. First, not all tariff systems are currently 
based on a revenue cap approach. For example the Czech Republic has a price 
cap system, where unit tariffs are set at the beginning of the regulatory period 
in line with the allowed revenue but later they are adjusted by a formula that 
included the inflation rate and the predetermined productivity improvement, 
but does not offer a guaranteed revenue. Under such an approach, in case ca-
pacity booking is reduced the risk falls on the TSO. 
In other cases the revenue cap approach is used, where annual adjustment 
is applied to the total revenue and unit tariffs are also corrected to allow for 
capacity booking variations. In this way the allowed revenue is basically 
guaranteed to the TSO, albeit possibly with a delay. Both approaches are ac-
ceptable: the price cap is sometimes preferred in cases where a large part 
of capacity and revenues are related to transit, to avoid a situation where 
changes in transit capacity bookings may affect tariffs paid by shippers serv-
ing domestic destinations. 
Regional integration clearly requires the harmonization of such approaches. 
Since risk borne by TSOs is different, rates of return may also differ.
Moreover, a full integration of the tariff systems would probably require 
further harmonisation. Under a common system, an increase in the allowed 
revenue for one of the TSOs would eventually be paid by all shippers that use 
the regional network, both for transit and for consumption in the region. In 
principle this affects all shippers but the impact could be more significant for 
neighbouring countries. It is likely that some harmonization would be useful 
to avoid the emergence of disputes. 
Last but not least, it should also be considered what impact the combined tariffs 
may have on transit flows. Usually the calculation of an entry-exit tariff over 
a broader area leads to relatively lower tariffs for longer distances and hence 
to a better position of transit. However, this is not always the case but depends 
on the chosen cost allocation criteria, which may be rather controversial as it 
is apparent in the current European discussion on this topic.
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To sum up, harmonization should involve at least:
•	 criteria for the valuation of the asset base, depreciation, rates of return and 
operational costs;
•	 duration and timing of tariff regulatory periods;
•	 cost allocation methodology to entry and exit points, including storage sites 
and LNG terminals;
•	 tariff structure (capacity, commodity and other components);
•	 criteria for tariff updating, with particular reference to the regulatory ac-
count” for the treatment of cost recovery or under-recovery;
•	 inflation adjustments of tariffs and capacity prices that are determined at 
auctions.
In any case, impacts of the regional integration on gas prices should be small, 
lower than 1% of the wholesale gas price.
(2) There is no internal congestion in the zone
From a technical perspective, the region must work as a single balancing zone. 
Any shipper would only be required to be balanced between all its flow allo-
cations at entry and exit points of the region, and not at the individual TSO 
or country sub-zones. This could mean that, for example, a shipper could be 
“long” in country A but “short” in interconnected country B, but it would still 
have no obligation to further balance if the imbalances in the two countries 
offset each other17. In such a case, TSOs must be able to transport the gas from 
long to short areas, or to use storage or other balancing tools to maintain the 
network operational conditions. 
A single balancing zone requires a significant effort, notably as it should be 
combined with changes required by the ENC on Balancing, not only by TSOs 
but also probably by Distribution System Operators. This ENC is not known 
in its final version as the present Report is being drafted, however the general 
17 Or, it would have to pay only for the smaller “balance of the imbalances”.
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principles seem to have been agreed. The Code will require balancing to occur 
on a daily basis by tools that are to be traded in a spot market, which can be 
a separate platform only for a transitional period. At present, none of the V4 
countries use market based balancing but administrative imbalance charges 
are defined by regulators. Only the Czech Republic and Hungary have limited 
markets for imbalances that help market players to trade and sometimes re-
duce penalty payments. In Poland, Gaz System has introduced market-based 
balancing regime in its national network code. It allows imbalances up to 5%.
For single market based balancing systems, NRAs need to cooperate very 
strictly. It requires the common setting of issues such as:
•	 the gas day and all its deadlines (nominations, re-nominations, confirma-
tions, trading sessions);
•	 settlement methodologies including the attribution of responsibilities and 
criteria for load profiling of non daily metered end users;
•	 content and timing of information to market players;
•	 tolerances and maximum hourly ceilings, if any;
•	 market price setting method.
More generally, the entry-exit model involves the ability to transfer gas from 
each entry to each exit of the region. This requires enough capacity that no 
congestion within the region normally occurs. if this is not the case, other solu-
tions may be appropriate, such as the trading region or market coupling, which 
will be considered later. In this respect, the choice of the best solution would 
require an analysis of the actual network conditions, including the availabil-
ity of flexibility resources like storage, flexible production and imports, or in-
terruptible consumers. This is a technical analysis that should be undertaken 
soon and will be included in the proposed roadmap (see next section).
As in the case of tariffs, it is likely that a very tight cooperation between par-
ticipating TSOs would be necessary, notably for balancing, as flows should be 
smoothly managed across the region. In fact it is very likely that the dispatch-
ing function in the interconnected networks should be centralised, establish-
ing a coordination body whose responsibilities would be close to those of an 
ISO (independent system operator). 
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It is worth wondering how large the interconnection should be to avoid con-
gestion, however this cannot be defined in general but it depends on specific 
scenario analysis that is beyond the scope of the present paper. While avoiding 
prejudice to the suggested technical analysis, it is likely that interconnections 
around 30% of the market size would be appropriate. This arises from the com-
parison of other European cases. For example Italy adopts a single balancing 
zone which is larger in terms of consumption than the combined V4 and spans 
over longer pipeline distances. The REKK study is (provisionally) forecasting 
substantial price alignment as a consequence of the proposed interconnec-
tions, but does not analyse the balancing requirements.
If these two conditions are met, a single virtual point can be identified in the 
region. Trading can be based on such a virtual point, where title transfer and 
other hub services would be provided. This leads to the next feature of this 
market model:
(3) A single market operator is defined or emerges for trading on the regional VTP
It is clear that trading at a single VTP cannot occur at more than one trading 
platform or exchange. On the other hand, many issues remain open in this re-
spect. For example Market Operators may simply provide a platform or offer 
an anonymous counterpart as well. They could offer products of different du-
ration as well as more advanced services like gas parking, wheeling, loaning, 
topping up/down and others. They may have responsibilities for settlement 
procedures, as happens already in the Czech Republic. At present three mar-
ket operators have been set up in the region - all of them as an offspring of the 
electricity market operator - in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Slo-
vak players including the TSO have been using the Austrian CEGH, which has 
been until recently organised for deliveries at the physical hub of Baumgarten 
at the Slovak-Austrian border. 
The Czech MO (OTE) has been operational for almost two years, offering 
a platform for intra-day trading as well as a monthly session for trading of 
imbalances. The Hungarian and Polish MO have only started their activity at 
the beginning of 2013, and have seen few transactions so far. The very limited 
liquidity, also in the Czech case after nearly two years of operations, seems 
to confirm that each national V4 market is too small for an effective and liq-
uid market to be operational. In fact, some stakeholders have noticed that 
even the neighbouring German Net Connect virtual hub, which is based on 
a physical market of over 40 bcm/year, is sometimes too small to offer enough 
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liquidity for balancing purposes. On the other hand the Czech intra-day mar-
ket has been normally converging with German hub prices and marginally 
departing from Austrian ones. 
The characteristics and location of the market operator are often a source of 
discussion and potential disputes at national or regional level, and the same 
could be said of the responsibilities that should be associated with this entity. 
Some proposals about it should be part of a general proposal about high lev-
el market design and have therefore been postponed to the next session. At 
this stage it can only be noticed that a political agreement about the location of 
a market operator is not likely in the early stages of V4 market integration, but 
it could emerge later. This choice could be partly the consequence of a broader 
distribution of the central responsibilities of a coordinated regional market, 
and is likely to be based on the evolution of infrastructure and liquidity at the 
national platforms that are currently being used.
2. Trading Region 
This concept has been suggested as an option of the recommended GTM. It en-
visages a single tariff and price zone but separate balancing areas, which may 
coincide with individual (National) TSOs, or parts thereof. This model is un-
precedented in gas, and needs to be clarified on several aspects. A study within 
the GRI SSE18 offers some theoretical answers.
In the TR model, several TSOs identify and establish a single market zone, 
which represents a virtual trading point that works as a virtual hub, just like 
in the previous model. The TR need not include the entire transmission sys-
tems but it could be limited to a part thereof, for example the main high pres-
sure, long distance lines. Shippers nominate entries into and exits from the 
TR and are allocated what they are nominated in the region, so that they are 
always balanced in the region. Imbalances are transferred to the balancing 
zones, which are connected to the TR typically through one or more exit point. 
For example the territory of a participating country, with its lower rank trans-
mission and distribution systems may be assumed to be part of the balancing 
zone. In this way each balancing zone may follow different rules.
18 See CEER Vision for a European Gas Target Model, Conclusions Paper, Ref: C11-GWG-82-03, 
1 December 2011, www.energy-regulators.eu: Wagner, Elbling & Co.; http://www.acer.eu-
ropa.eu/Gas/Regional_%20Intiatives/South_South-East_GRI/Pages/GRI-SSE-studies.aspx
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For tariff purposes, the TR works like the single market zone: entry and exit tar-
iffs may be pooled and their revenue allocated to participating TSOs in relation 
to their costs. All comments of the previous section under (1) are applicable. 
On the other hand, balancing may differ among the participating zones, and 
each participating country or TSO can follow it own rules. Each balancing zone 
is also connected to the TR, which will be also used as a balancing market. 
Shippers will be able buy or sell gas in the spot market of the TR to be balanced 
in each zone, however they may also use flexibility resources that are internal 
to each balancing zone, like interruptible customers, production or storage.
The main advantage of this solution is that it requires a smaller harmonization 
effort than the single market zone, as balancing rules can differ. In fact, bal-
ancing reforms always involve remarkable efforts by all stakeholders (NRAs, 
TSO, DSO, SSOs and shippers). Very detailed criteria and rules must be de-
fined, including on settlement, profiling, information provision, tolerances, 
guarantees. If the international harmonization can be avoided at least in the 
first years of market integration, this could facilitate a faster integration. 
Still there are some doubts about how the TR should be organised and about 
the minimum harmonization requirements that are required anyway. Experi-
ences of more advanced markets have shown that balancing rules and markets 
can easily generate loopholes that can be exploited by smart shippers, with 
costs falling on all users. For example, different timing can create arbitration 
opportunities between the different balancing zones. Shippers that are active 
in several zones could speculate by using the different tolerances, position in-
formation, or settlement rules. NRAs should probably jointly and closely moni-
tor the market.
A related issue to be ascertained is how much harmonisation could be required in 
new mechanisms that are expected to be introduced in the implementation of the 
Third Package. An interesting example is the “oversubscription and buy back” 
mechanism that is envisaged as the main short term congestion management 
tool19. Such a mechanism has potential costs that are normally raised through 
TSO tariffs. In the case of a single market zone or a TR encompassing several 
TSOs such costs would be presumably shared among participating TSOs. In the 
V4 region, the most congested entries that may create problems are probably the 
19 It is included in the revised Annex I of Regulation 715/2009/EC, as modified by the Commis-
sion Decision  of 24 August 2012.
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Mosonmagyarovar entry on the HAG from Austria into Hungary and the Lasow 
entry from Germany into Poland. Inclusion of Austria into the TR would possi-
bly move the congestion further west towards the Oberkappel and Burghausen 
IPs between Austria and Germany. Such risks are higher as far as western hubs 
have lower prices than Russian gas, triggering eastbound commercial flows. On 
the other hand opening or enhancement of connection between the Brotherhood 
East west system and Poland and Hungary may reduce the problem as the larger 
connections between Germany and the Czech Republic could be exploited. 
The market organisation of the TR would be similar to the single market zone 
case. A single market operator is likely to emerge, and would be probably cho-
sen by market forces if a political decision is not taken early.
3. Multiple coupled market zones
In this solution each TSO or country retains its own market zone. Each has its 
own entry-exit tariff system, virtual trading point and balancing rules. Even 
this solution requires substantial harmonisation of short term market rules, 
and some interconnection between the zones. However, unlike in the previ-
ous cases, congestion may occur and it would be treated by a Market Coupling 
algorithm where different prices may emerge after joint offers are presented in 
the coupled zones. 
This solution requires less interconnection investment and a reduced harmo-
nisation effort with respect to the single price zone or the TR, yet coupled mar-
kets also need some common market rules; for example the deadlines of the gas 
day must be the same. There may be separate market operators but a common 
office for market coupling must be designated. 
The main difficulty is the very limited experience in adopting the market cou-
pling concept in gas markets. Some experience and studies are being devel-
oped within the NW Gas Regional Initiative and may provide advice about the 
feasibility and condition of MC. Pilot projects have been launched in France 
(between the PEG-Nord and PEG-Sud zones, both managed by the same TSO, 
GRT-gaz), and between GTS and its sister company, Gasunie Deutschland. First 
experiences have been satisfactory in the French case, where a real physical 
congestion occurs between Northern and Southern France.
This market linking tool has actually been devised for electricity interconnec-
tions, which by their nature are very often congested. MC then provides an 
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optimal way of allocating congested IPs. However in gas markets contractual 
congestion has been common in Europe, but physical congestion is rare. 
In the V4 region, MC could be an interesting solution for the immediate in-
clusion of countries that are currently poorly interconnected: as illustrated 
in Figure 2. This is the case of Poland and also of Hungary. For MC to be oper-
ated with these countries some capacity products, though limited, should be 
devised. In the latter case the product would either include Austria or use 
some capacity on the Austrian system, unless a link through Ukraine could 
be established.
On the other hand, MC is seen as an inadequate solution for countries where 
ample capacity allows for more ambitious market integration, as is currently 
the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia and of Hungary after 2015; or of the 
whole V4 region after all interconnections envisaged in Figure 8 are commis-
sioned. With abundant capacity MC would almost always yield no congestion 
rents so that it would turn out to be a useless tool. 
In the short term MC may be accepted as a way to connect Hungary with the 
Czech Republic through Austria, and Poland with the Czech Republic through 
the existing interconnector as soon as possible: in this case the first step would 
be the creation of the necessary cross border capacity products. Such prepara-
tory work is however necessary for any proposed solution and should therefore 
be started anyway.
4. Independent connections to liquid hubs
This solution avoids any proposal of active market integration, with the excep-
tion of those necessary to ensure the security of supply standards required by 
Regulation 994/2010/EC. It can be therefore deemed as a “business as usual” 
alternative where no special policy initiative on market design is adopted.
This approach considers that markets can in fact be integrated, with substan-
tial price alignment, by market forces that select one or more favourite trading 
spots, which act as benchmarks for other market zones. This happens if all 
connected zones can “shop” in that/those market(s), even with limited direct 
interconnection between them. For example, Ireland is formally organised as 
an entry-exit tariff, balancing and market zone, but in fact it is not actively de-
veloping its own market but rather acting to ensure that it can access the larger, 
more competitive and liquid adjacent British market. Likewise, V4 countries 
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may limit their interconnection and harmonisation to what is justified by mar-
ket decision or security of supply requirements, but decide to elect (e.g.) a Ger-
man (or a future merged German-Dutch) hub as their natural marketplace. If 
no market integration is promoted this solution could indeed emerge.
In this case, the regulatory strategy would be partly different and focus more 
on ensuring the viability of connections with the most liquid hub(s) and the 
availability of transmission products to move gas from/to it. Yet much of the 
required work – notably the establishment of bundled cross border capacity 
products – would be necessary anyway. NRAs and TSOs should therefore work 
on them irrespective of the market model that will be implemented.
Connection to more liquid hubs in Western Europe is certainly the imme-
diate objective of shippers, be they retailers or large end customers, and in 
particular of the newcomers who can hardly rely on the customary (and cur-
rently more expensive) Russian supplies. On the other hand implementa-
tion of this model in the short term would simply amount to postponing the 
harmonization of regulatory and business practices beyond what is strictly 
required by ENCs. In fact price alignment would only be triggered by com-
mon alignment to a more advanced hub. The current situation in the Czech 
Republic, which is already substantially integrated with the German market, 
would be the example to be progressively followed by other V4 countries as 
interconnection is being constructed.
This solution may appear very realistic and to involve lower costs than the 
most ambitious integration models that have been outlined above. It is not sur-
prising that it enjoys some support not only in the Czech Republic but also in 
other V4 countries that are not yet in the condition to fully implement it. It also 
has some appeal for governments and regulators, as they would retain more 
leverage on the industry, which would have to be progressively reduced under 
a more coordinated approach and a tighter market integration in favour of an 
agreed and longer lasting regulatory framework.
On the other hand, this solution amounts to giving up in advance any attempt 
to create an independent hub in Central Europe. Its appeal is entirely based on 
the idea that Western hubs always feature lower prices than those that may 
prevail in CEE. This need not be the case: the historical experience shows that 
even with oil related long term contracts prices may well be lower than those 
of markets where prices are determined by gas supply and demand. Further-
more, it does not consider the opportunities offered by the Central-Eastern 
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part of Europe and listed in section 3, which would be fostered by the crea-
tion of an independent V4 hub: from a more dynamic demand to perspective of 
conventional or unconventional production in the region as well as in its Black 
Sea shore neighbours; from direct and therefore cheaper access to the world 
LNG market to the perspective of a more dynamic and concentrated Russian 
gas industry. 
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V. PROPOSAlS fOR JOINT gTM V4 IMPlEMENTATION
Upon consideration of the possible models, the market situation and opportu-
nities and the available theoretical models for market integration, and after 
detailed discussion with over stakeholders and independent observers in the 
V4 countries (see List of interviewees), the following strategy is proposed for 
a joint implementation of the European Gas Target Model in the V4 countries. 
As already noted in the introduction, the strategy is outlined in such a way as to:
•	 be as consistent as possible with incentives that drive the behaviour of 
markets forces, as well as the political objectives of governments;
•	 prefer actions that may be open to different developments, so that they can 
be considered as “no regrets” options that may be consistent with several 
models and developments.
The proposed strategy is a flexible process rather than a fixed roadmap. It must 
learn from each step how to better devise the following one. Not all data are 
now available to devise the best strategy, as the choice depends notably on the 
development of the market opportunities outlined in section 3 above. 
Each step would presumably require the development of operational studies 
for their implementation. It is however suggested that such studies should 
be developed by the parties concerned (TSOs, NRAs, MOs). Whereas contri-
butions by external consultants may help, the operational nature should be 
outlined. Practical proposals for the necessary amendments of current market 
rules and procedures should be outlined. 
With these caveats in mind, the following steps are suggested:
a. Establishment of a working connection between market zones of 
the V4 and of neighbouring countries. Regulators and TSOs should 
work to ensure that all market rules ensure the smoothest connection for 
the delivery of gas between the V4 countries as well as at V4 borders with 
EU Member States (Germany, Austria, Croatia20, Romania). Such connec-
tions should be based on the establishment of bundled and (if possible) 
20 Croatia will be a Member State of the European Union as of 1 July 2013, and is therefore 
treated as a Member State in this forward-looking project.
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bi-directional capacity products, starting from and extending the pilot 
experiences already under way. 
The coordination of necessary implementation steps could be devised within 
the framework of the GRI-SSE (see also section 6), including interoperabil-
ity issues and border allocation criteria. Each TSO or National network codes 
and market rules should be checked for consistency and joint proposal for up-
dating should be prepared. The GRI SSE may strive to achieve similar links 
with neighbouring countries that are not EU members but freely agree to be 
included, notably if they have accepted the basic common rules of the Euro-
pean gas market by signing the Energy Community Treaty (Serbia, Ukraine). 
In particular, harmonised capacity products should be developed as part of the 
implementation of the Capacity Allocation Network ENC, notably for delivery 
by physical or virtual reverse flow of gas from operational western hubs that 
already meet the GTM requirements (Gaspool, NCG, TTF, NBP, PEG, PSV). In 
relation to this, a Roadmap for the early implementation of the Capacity Alloca-
tion Mechanisms Network Code is being developed by ACER and ENTSOG, de-
tailing, among other aspects, the working arrangements, time schedule, roles 
and responsibilities and geographical scope21.
b. Development of market zones. Independent existing market zones 
should be consolidated. Whereas entry-exit systems and market opera-
tors have been established everywhere, some regulatory steps should 
be undertaken for their effectiveness, notably the phasing out of any 
remaining wholesale price controls. 
Common cross border trading zones could also be developed, for instance the 
proposed Austrian/Czech/Slovak Trading Region, which could use the large 
existing interconnection capacity of the three countries. 
c. Connection of the V4 countries. The connection of the Hungarian 
and Polish market zones with the Czech-Slovak core, possibly already 
linked through the suggested TR, should be based on simplified Mar-
ket Coupling procedures, due to the limited existing interconnection of 
21 In 2012 the South Gas Regional Initiative already made progress in the common definition 
and application of CAM in the cross-border interconnections in the Region. This can be 
a simple example also for harmonised CAM implementation in the V4 region. See http://
www.acer.europa.eu/Gas/Regional_%20Intiatives/South_GRI/Pages/default.aspx
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these countries. Connections would be based on the standardised ca-
pacity products developed under step (1). 
A preliminary study should consider the feasibility and preliminary require-
ments for market coupling, considering that in any case such procedures are 
likely to be relatively short-lived, as the development of larger interconnectors 
could make them redundant. Yet the time required for such development (pos-
sibly 4-5 years, notably in the case of Poland) would justify such development. 
The operational study on MC should also consider the feasibility of connecting 
Poland and Hungary with each other and with Slovakia through the Ukrainian 
network. Other neighbouring countries (Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, and oth-
ers) may be invited to join the process.
d. Enhanced cooperation of the V4 countries: joint implementation of 
the European Network Codes. This step would be necessary for the 
establishment of a single V4 market zone. Even if the “Trading Region” 
model with separate national balancing were chosen, a coordinated im-
plementation of Network Codes would be beneficial for the region, as it 
could represent not only the set-up of a larger market area with com-
mon rules, but also an efficient use of limited regulatory resources. In 
many cases a joint implementation, with the establishment of common 
NRA and TSO task forces would not only lead to harmonised implemen-
tation, but also to better regulatory quality. Each task could be led by 
one of the participating countries, with members from all others. 
Synergies are therefore a substantial reason for the cooperation of both NRAs 
and TSOs (and possibly Market Operators as well). Furthermore, in the regula-
tors' case it is worth recalling that international cooperation reinforces inde-
pendence, as it is harder to interfere in their decisions or to modify rules that 
have been agreed across national borders. As a consequence of this, interna-
tional cooperation reduces regulatory risk and enhances the attractiveness of 
the region for external market players and investors. 
The content of this cooperation would include:
1. The establishment of a single entry-exit zone, to be implemented once 
sufficient interconnection capacity becomes available, involving inter-TSO 
compensation to achieve the balance between actual and required reve-
nues. As long as no sufficient capacity is available the entry exit zones may 
be split, with interconnection charges, as in the model developed by French 
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TSO GRT-gaz. An operational study on the establishment of a single tar-
iff system should be started soon, outlining a standardised cost allocation 
methodology for the region and steps necessary to overcome the current 
discrepancies between the national tariff systems, already outlined in sec-
tion 4 above under (1). If the trading region involving Austria and possibly 
other countries is developed, this study should involve the remaining V4 
countries at the earliest possible opportunity to ensure consistency for the 
future extension of the trading region or its evolution into a single balanc-
ing zone.
2. Coordinated implementation of the Capacity Allocation Mechanism 
(CAM) The CAM- ENC requires capacity to be allocated by auctions at all 
IPs. Yet the ENC entails some discretional development, as not all capacity 
products are defined by the EU but more could be envisaged. In particular, 
the ENC focuses on individual IPs or on combinations of several IPs con-
necting any two adjacent market areas (known as Virtual IPs), but it does 
not address the issue of capacity booking on “routes” encompassing several 
TSOs along a certain flow direction. This is in fact a limitation, as shippers 
wishing to reach a destination market that requires the use of several ad-
jacent systems may not be sure about the correspondence of their capac-
ity rights on all required IPs. On the other hand this is an opportunity for 
further cooperation between regional TSOs, supported by the respective 
NRAs. For example, TSOs may be requested to develop and offer joint prod-
ucts along the new NS corridor, linking PL-SK-HU or PL-CZ-SK-HU, as well 
as on the East-West corridor22. This would make it easier to obtain supplies 
from (e.g.) the Polish LNG terminal, from Southern routes entering the re-
gion through Hungary (Nabucco, South Stream, LNG landed in Croatia), or 
through the Western interconnections of the V4 countries. 
The region's TSOs may also consider a common choice for the development or 
adaptation of the platform for capacity allocation and trading. Whereas some 
stakeholders support the adoption of PRISMA, a platform that has been already 
accepted by several western European TSOs, some criticisms have been heard 
in the region, notably due to its single currency setting, which may require 
adaptation. V4 TSOs may jointly consider the opportunity of a co-ordinated 
customisation.
22 The GATRAC pilot project is already offering a single platform for connection between the 
Slovak and Czech TSOs and Germany's Ontras and therefore providing access to the Ger-
man hub Gaspool.
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3. A coordinated capacity development mechanism. In the gas market, 
it is also interesting to consider the opportunity of developing integrated 
auctions, where shippers bid for capacity that may be offered even beyond 
the current interconnection capacity. If more capacity is requested than is 
available, bids are considered for a market test, where the case for capac-
ity reinforcement is considered and ultimately decided on23. In the V4 case 
this tool may be interesting, for example to decide on the reinforcement of 
existing and new interconnections, also by looping or adding compression 
power to existing pipelines, and possibly for the construction or enhance-
ments of LNG terminals. An advantage of this tool lies in the fact that it does 
not require a specific process (as is the case of open seasons) but it is strictly 
joined to the CAM, where interested parties are expected to bid anyway.
4. harmonised balancing rules. Balancing it is an extremely demanding 
area where it is necessary for TSOs, DSOs and NRAs to make an effort, and 
may attain the greatest benefit by a coordinated development. Yes, several 
balancing models are available, but a common choice and adaptation to fea-
tures of the region looks possible. Since much would have to be reformed 
in this area anyway, V4 countries have much to gain and very little to lose 
from harmonisation. 
This would not necessarily lead to the decision of merging the national balanc-
ing zones, which would be left to the next step. Harmonization would include 
the main allocation and balancing provisions, tolerances, penalties and their 
relationship with cash-out prices, which would be related to a single spot mar-
ket, as required by the Balancing ENC. At first this could be the market zone 
of the above suggested Trading Region, which could be connected with Poland 
and Hungary by MC, subject to the existing capacity.
5. The establishment of common congestion management criteria, in line 
with EU network codes and regulations, notably regarding the largely new 
overcapacity and buy-back mechanism to be established as a main short 
term congestion management tool. NRAs could also agree on common cri-
teria for the implementation of long term CM tools like capacity release 
programmes. 
23 Frontier Economics, “Impact assessment of policy options on incremental capacity for EU 
gas transmission”, Report prepared for ACER, February 2013, www.acer.eu
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6. The pursuit of common customer protection provisions. Whereas this 
topic may not seem part of an integrated market design, it is nonetheless 
strictly related and has been frequently mentioned by stakeholders in the 
region as a major barrier to the development of a functioning integrated mar-
ket in V4 (and other CEE) countries. The relatively high wholesale prices that 
prevail in the region and the lack of competition have prompted regulators 
and governments to impose price controls on wholesale and/or retail prices, 
at least for the most vulnerable categories like households, small businesses 
and selected public services (see section 2). Since private investors are heav-
ily afraid of such controls, which may jeopardise their profitability, a vicious 
circle may arise where prices are high due to lack of competition but compe-
tition is missing (also) due to the existence of price control. 
In some case these price controls have been very effective, as they are based on 
rolling averages of cheap domestic production and imports: this is typically the 
case of Poland and Hungary as well as Romania and Croatia (see Figures 3-6). 
In the case of Hungary, price controls mostly affecting the residential sector 
seem to be related to relatively high prices affecting other consuming sectors 
(and through this probably the power prices). On average prices are not higher 
in the Czech Republic, where any such controls have been absent for over sev-
en years. This problem is indeed common in the EU as several member States 
still have some sort of end user price controls in place. Such controls have been 
criticised (among others) by CEER24, and the European Commission has taken 
action against some Member States (notably France) asking for a removal or 
phasing out of such controls. The European Court of Justice has ruled25 that 
such controls are compatible with European legislation but must be temporary, 
cost based and the measure should be clearly defined, transparent, non dis-
criminatory and verifiable, to guarantee equal access for EU gas companies to 
consumers, as well as limited in duration and should not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the objective pursued.
The integration of V4 markets provides a gradual way out of the current price 
controls. NRAs could envisage common criteria for protected end user prices, 
24 CEER, “Status Review of End-User Price Regulation as of 1 January 2010”, Ref: E10-
CEM-34-03, 8 September 2010, http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/
EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_PAPERS /Customers/Tab1
25 Case C-265/08, Federutility, Assogas, Libarna Gas SpA, Collino Commercio SpA, Sadori Gas 
Srl, Egea Commerciale Srl, E.On Vendita Srl, Sorgenia SpA v Autorità per l’energia elettrica 
e il gas [2010] 20.04.2010.
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which would be based on the common wholesale prices. Pending market cou-
pling, the prices could differ among the national zones, yet the methodology 
would be similar. At the same time, market integration and the removal of bot-
tlenecks would lead to the emergence of common wholesale prices that could 
be the basis of domestic customer protection until sufficient competitive pres-
sure has developed. In order to promote market entry, NRAs could also an-
nounce criteria (e.g. in terms of market concentration or price alignment) that 
would lead to the removal of remaining price controls.
7. Implementation of a single market zone in the V4 region. Once the fol-
lowing steps have been carried out, at least three years will have elapsed 
and the connection of Hungary and to some extent also of Poland with Slo-
vakia and Czech Republic should be operational. Moreover, several of the 
opportunities that may justify the independent development of a V4 hub 
should be clearer: for example, the European carbon emission programme, 
the choice of a route for Caspian gas, the construction of South Stream, 
the perspectives of unconventional gas production in Poland, Ukraine and 
elsewhere, the fate of the Croatian LNG terminal. On the internal side, the 
cooperation of V4 (and possibly other) NRAs and TSOs will have been more 
or less smooth and effective, and the ENC will have entered into full force. 
With the opening of the Hungary-Slovakia link, market coupling between 
them and the Czech Republic will no longer be useful, while it could still 
be in place with Poland even if the current interconnector with the Czech 
Republic may have been reinforced in line with the plans. The direct link 
between Poland and Slovakia should be under construction at that stage.
At that point, if all previous steps and the necessary infrastructure proceed 
smoothly, NRAs and TSOs may make a sensible decision on the opportunity 
of either merging their balancing zones or extending the Trading Region ar-
rangement to all V4 countries. Such a choice would by no means reduce the ap-
peal of the single market zone, as the V4 would have a single price zone anyway. 
The choice between a single or multiple balancing zone (TR model) at that point 
would be a technical issue, mostly based on the ability of TSOs and regulators 
to agree on a single balancing model and on the ability of the joint system – as 
assessed by a technical study – to ensure balancing of the transmission grid 
over the whole region. 
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VI. INSTITuTIONAl ISSuES
The pursuit of the V4 market integration plan would entail significant institu-
tional developments. In order to enhance the credibility and ensure a steady 
implementation of the plan, several intermediate objectives must be defined 
and a few entities in charge of their achievements must be identified or created. 
The establishment of joint bodies for an enhanced co-operation at the V4 level 
would stress the credibility of the market rules as internationally coordinated 
regulations are much more stable than national ones. On the other hand, the 
creation of too many new institutional bodies should be avoided to avoid a bu-
reaucratisation of the process and conflict about the distribution of responsibil-
ities. The attribution of necessary roles to existing bodies should be preferred.
In the regulatory area, committees for the streamlining of market rules and 
the implementation of network codes should be established, in charge of:
•	 capacity product organisation, allocation and congestion management;
•	 interoperability and business practices;
•	 tariffs;
•	 balancing.
These Committees may be organised by NRAs, with a fair attribution of re-
sponsibilities. For example, each NRA could be given primary responsibility 
on one of the topics, as task force leader. This would ensure a fair attribution of 
responsibilities while allowing each NRA to be part of the process. 
Among TSOs, a similar division of tasks could be effective, preferably avoiding 
giving the same country the leading NRA and TSO role on each topic. 
The GRI SSE may offer a suitable institutional framework for the regulatory 
harmonisation. However, the current GRI SSE organisation seems to work 
more as an information and discussion forum than as an operational body. 
This depends also on its broad geographical scope, which extends to the South 
of the V4 to include Austria, Italy, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece 
and encompassing the Western Balkans. This area is probably too large for an 
effective operational role. It is suggested that the GRI SSE should be divided 
into smaller sub-zones (among which one could be the V4) and organised as 
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task forces. The Electricity Regional Initiative, which has been organised with 
smaller zones and whith follows the logic of overlapping countries, has been 
more practical in orientation and can be regarded as a positive example.
Work of the GRI could be organised through implementation groups aimed at 
the main issues, as already happens in other European GRI regions, aimed at 
implementing the GTM in the above mentioned areas.
As noticed in the previous section, a common gas exchange is not an urgent 
issue. As far as markets are not adequately interconnected there is no reason 
to choose one of them, even though they are not likely to enjoy much liquidity. 
Once market zones are interconnected a single gas exchange would probably 
emerge. However, regulatory harmonization should define the responsibilities 
of market operators vis-à-vis those of TSOs, which is not necessarily the same 
in all countries.
A body in charge of the infrastructure development procedure could also be set 
up. It may be located at regulatory level and should be in charge of organising 
coordinated open seasons or integrated auctions for the development of infra-
structure. In case of further uncertainties about the development of any piece 
of infrastructure this body would launch the open season or integrated auc-
tion, with a preliminary clear commitment by the European Union, National 
Governments and NRAs for participation in the investment and the setting of 
clear conditions for the success of the procedure. 
The greatest institutional development would probably concern TSOs. For an 
effective coordination of dispatching and balancing, tariff setting and revenue 
redistribution, and the coordinated system of auctions it is likely that inter-
TSO bodies for transmission management activities should be organised. Their 
responsibility would be presumably similar to those of a regional ISO, or to 
those of the inter-TSO body that coordinates TSOs in Austria. Further insights 
can be obtained notably from the German experience, where several TSOs are 
coordinated into only three tariff and balancing zones. Details of this coordi-
nation are beyond the scope of the present paper.
Whereas coordination may appear to be further burden on individual TSOs, 
it should be noticed that this happens in a business environment where the 
implementation of the Third Package and the demand crisis are triggering an 
overhaul of the European gas industry, notably regarding TSOs that have been 
or are being dismissed by large gas companies and are seeking new synergies 
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and development opportunities. This is particularly true for the Czech and Slo-
vak TSOs, which are now threatened by a significant flow reduction due to the 
opening of alternative routes for Russian gas, and are currently going through 
a process of ownership change. Governments should consider that TSOs in 
such markets are relatively small, so that some form of consolidation could en-
tail significant economies of scale. TSOs and their owners may consider the op-
portunities offered by the V4 integration process, which may trigger alliances 
going beyond the offer of coordinated products, without necessarily leading to 
the full merger perspective. Similar alliances are being tested in other parts of 
Europe for example between Italy's SNAM and Belgium's Fluxys for a coordi-
nated North-South Corridor in Western Europe. 
Finally, the remaining state owned supply companies of V4 countries may also 
consider the perspective of alliances and integration. The development of the 
European gas markets shows that there is room only for large and efficient 
companies with markets in several countries and a large supply portfolio. The 
old national champions in the region may be too large for their original home 
countries, but they are probably too small for the European market. In the long 
term their convergence is probably the only alternative to takeover from larger 
corporations.
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figure 1. Transmission pipelines in V4 and neighbouring countries
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figure 2. Interconnection capacities of V4 countries
SK
CZ
PL
H
/
©
D
 931.5
 42.6+VI
RUS, BY
 1033.4
RUS, UA
 133.2
 VI
RO
 50.9
SRB
 139.8
 VI
HR
 102
RUS, UA
SK  3056.8
HU  596.7A1611.9  SK
186.6+110.8 (VI) SK
D
 1502.3
 539.5+VI
 782.5
 260.8
 4.2
 VI
All data in MWh/day
VI − Virtual Interruptible capacity
Source: GIE
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
67
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
05
/2
01
3
figure 3. Prices for large industrial consumers
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figure 4. Prices for medium industrial consumers 
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
2007
2nd sem
2008
1st sem
2008
2nd sem
2009
1st sem
2009
2nd sem
2010
1st sem
2010
2nd sem
2011
1st sem
2011
2nd sem
2012
1st sem
euro/MWh
Slovakia
Hungary
Austria
Germany
Poland
Romania
Czech Republic
Source: Eurostat
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
68
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
05
/2
01
3
figure 5. Prices for larger residential customers
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figure 6. Prices for individual residential customers
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figure 7. Relationship between storage (working gas) and consumption in EU 
Member States (bcm)
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figure 8. Interconnection capacities of V4 countries after the implementation 
of current plans
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figure 9. Gas prices in some european hubs
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figure 10. A stylised integrated market
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